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Computing 256-bit elliptic curve discrete logarithms in 26 days on a fault-tolerant trapped-ion quantum computer with 20,000 qubits

Published 4 Sep 2026 in quant-ph | (2609.05625v1)

Abstract: One of the strengths of our recently proposed Walking Cat Architecture for a trapped-ion quantum computer is that it is straightforward to extend and optimize for a specific application. As a proof-of-concept, here we present such optimizations for solving the $256$-bit elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) on secp256k1\mathtt{secp256k1}, which is the elliptic curve used by blockchain technologies such as Bitcoin, using Shor's algorithm. We optimize the circuits from Schrottenloher's recent work and arrive at a logical quantum circuit for solving the ECDLP using about $1450$ qubits and 4010<sup>640\cdot 10<sup>6 Toffoli gates, with a rigorous lower bound on the logical-level success probability that holds with confidence at least 12<sup>1281-2<sup>{-128}. Using our compilation toolchain with manual optimization of the logical layout and integrated routing, we produce estimates for the logical measurement depth and the required number of physical qubits by compiling all components to measurement schedules that obey the architectural constraints. A key ingredient is a fast CCZ magic-state factory and a depth-one CCZ state injection, reducing the execution time of CCZ gates by a factor of $31$. We increase the logical-measurement parallelism using non-overlapping cat-based measurements in parallel, and we leverage the recently proposed logical CliNR protocol to speed up Clifford operations. To reduce the qubit overhead, we introduce a more efficient loss correction protocol, design a layout that allows us to recycle the CliNR ancilla qubits, and provision reusable cat-state resources according to the circuit's peak measurement parallelism. All results and optimizations combined, we conclude that a trapped-ion quantum computer based on our architecture can solve the ECDLP on secp256k1\mathtt{secp256k1} in approximately 25.7 days using 19,397 physical qubits with an estimated success probability of 63%63\%.

Summary

  • The paper estimates that solving the 256-bit elliptic-curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) on Bitcoin's secp256k1 curve requires approximately 19,397 physical trapped-ion qubits, an expected runtime of 25-26 days per attempt, and a heuristic single-shot success probability of 63.3%.
  • The research involves a four-level lowering process and optimization techniques such as arithmetic optimizations and logical circuit reductions, including reduced Toffoli gates and innovative transport and measurement strategies to maximize efficiency.
  • They achieved a significant optimization in runtime and memory usage by direct production of the CCZ factory states, introduction of logical CliNR, integrated routing and cached measurement schedules using more detailed simulation than prior methods.

The paper presents an end-to-end resource estimate for solving the 256-bit elliptic-curve discrete logarithm problem on the Bitcoin curve secp256k1secp256k1 with Shor’s algorithm. Its central estimate is 19,397 physical trapped-ion qubits, an expected runtime of 25.7 days per attempt, and a heuristic single-shot success probability of 63.3%. The result is obtained by jointly optimizing the elliptic-curve arithmetic, logical measurement schedules, quantum LDPC fault-tolerance, ion transport, magic-state production, Clifford-frame management, and compiler-level routing. The work builds on optimized ECDLP circuits (Schrottenloher, 1 Jun 2026) and the Walking Cat trapped-ion architecture (Tripier et al., 21 Apr 2026), but differs from conventional resource estimates by compiling the complete application into architecture-constrained measurement schedules rather than extrapolating from Toffoli counts alone.

End-to-end methodology

The paper follows a four-level lowering process. It begins with the mathematical formulation of ECDLP and Shor’s period-finding algorithm, proceeds to a reversible circuit for double-scalar multiplication, compiles that circuit into logical measurement schedules, and finally maps the schedules to a trapped-ion quantum error-correction architecture.

Figure 1

Figure 1: End-to-end lowering from the mathematical ECDLP algorithm to logical circuits, executable measurement schedules, and native fault-tolerant trapped-ion operations.

The target problem is to recover dd from Q=[d]PQ=[d]P in a prime-order subgroup of the curve

y2=x3+7y^2=x^3+7

over the 256-bit pseudo-Mersenne field with

p=2256232977.p=2^{256}-2^{32}-977.

The quantum oracle computes

[k]P+[l]Q[k]P+[l]Q

in superposition. The implementation uses a windowed semi-classical inverse QFT with window size w=16w=16. A direct table lookup replaces the first point addition, and the final three of the nominal 32 windows are removed in favor of classical postprocessing. The resulting computation contains 28 windowed point additions, plus the initial lookup and semi-classical Fourier-transform operations.

This decomposition is important because the point-addition oracle, rather than the QFT, dominates both non-Clifford cost and logical depth. The paper consequently optimizes the complete arithmetic-and-architecture stack around repeated affine point addition.

Logical circuit reductions

The logical circuit uses approximately 1,457 logical qubits and 39 million Toffoli gates. Relative to the starting circuits of (Schrottenloher, 1 Jun 2026), the Toffoli estimate decreases from approximately 58 million to 39 million without increasing the logical width beyond the previously reported 1,462-qubit target.

Two arithmetic transformations provide most of the circuit-level savings. First, the binary-gcd-based in-place multiplication and division circuits are rewritten so that controlled additions become conditionally inverted additions. In the relevant adder constructions, conditionally inverted operations require substantially fewer non-Clifford resources than controlled additions. Second, modular squaring is specialized to the pseudo-Mersenne modulus using a single Karatsuba split. The resulting squarer reduces the non-Clifford cost of the direct multiplier by approximately 50% for the relevant subroutine.

The point-addition circuit uses three table lookups and measurement-based uncomputation. Random offsets are added both to the initial accumulator and to the classical lookup tables. These offsets eliminate explicit handling of the point at infinity and randomize the scalar inputs at which exceptional elliptic-curve cases or approximate arithmetic failures occur.

The resulting point-addition circuit requires approximately 1.196×1061.196\times 10^6 Toffoli gates, excluding the three lookup costs. With 28 point additions and lookup overhead, the paper obtains

28(1.196×106+3216)39.0×10628\left(1.196\times10^6+3\cdot2^{16}\right) \approx39.0\times10^6

Toffoli gates. This count is a logical-gate estimate; the architecture-level runtime is determined by the measurement schedule, where measurement-based uncomputation and Clifford processing contribute materially.

Approximate arithmetic and success probability

The arithmetic is intentionally approximate. Truncated carry propagation, shortened comparisons, approximate modular reduction, approximate phase repair, and bounded binary-gcd iterations can produce either computational-basis errors or residual (1)(-1) phases. The paper therefore analyzes algorithmic success separately from logical hardware errors.

For the concrete parameter choices dd0 and dd1, the authors derive component-level bounds for approximate modular addition, subtraction, negation, square subtraction, and binary-gcd multiplication and division. The binary-gcd bound is obtained through a Monte Carlo experiment with one million uniformly sampled input pairs. Twenty-one failures are observed for each of multiplication and division. A Clopper–Pearson analysis yields, with confidence at least dd2, a failure probability below dd3 for each operation under the simulated input distribution. The paper then introduces a factor-of-four correction to account for the nonuniform distribution induced by elliptic-curve coordinate differences.

For one affine point addition, the combined failure probability is bounded by

dd4

A union bound over the 28 point additions gives

dd5

with confidence at least dd6. Exceptional affine-addition cases contribute less than dd7 under the random accumulator and table masks and are therefore negligible relative to approximate-arithmetic failures.

The paper’s principal analytical contribution is a translation from this per-input failure bound to a bound on the success probability of Shor’s algorithm. Random masks ensure that every fixed scalar pair dd8 fails with probability at most dd9 over the classical randomization. If Q=[d]PQ=[d]P0 is the ideal-oracle success probability, the approximate-oracle success probability satisfies

Q=[d]PQ=[d]P1

This bound is stronger than a generic state-distance argument, which would yield a degradation proportional to Q=[d]PQ=[d]P2. Using Mosca’s rigorous ideal-oracle lower bound of approximately 0.657 gives an approximate-arithmetic success lower bound of 0.553 before hardware errors. Using Ekerå’s heuristic ideal-oracle estimate of 0.99 gives an approximate-oracle estimate of approximately 0.861.

The distinction between these two values is consequential. After hardware-level logical failures are included, the paper reports a rigorous-style end-to-end lower estimate of 40.7% based on Mosca’s bound and a heuristic end-to-end estimate of 63.3% based on Ekerå’s postprocessing analysis. Five independent devices would raise the probability that at least one attempt succeeds to approximately 99.3% under the 63.3% estimate, but this assumes independent failures and does not reduce the per-device runtime.

Architecture and fault-tolerant instruction set

The target machine is a specialized extension of the Walking Cat architecture. It uses trapped ions transported on a two-dimensional grid and quantum LDPC codes rather than surface codes. The principal memory code is Q102, a Q=[d]PQ=[d]P3 generalized bicycle code encoding 22 logical qubits per block. The architecture also uses Q66, a Q=[d]PQ=[d]P4 code for CCZ factories, and Knill’s Q=[d]PQ=[d]P5 C6 code for zero-level magic-state preparation.

At physical error rate Q=[d]PQ=[d]P6, the reported logical error rates per syndrome-extraction cycle are

Code Parameters Syndrome-extraction depth Logical error rate
Q102 Q=[d]PQ=[d]P7 27 POCs Q=[d]PQ=[d]P8
Q66 Q=[d]PQ=[d]P9 17 POCs y2=x3+7y^2=x^3+70
C6 y2=x3+7y^2=x^3+71 5.4 POCs y2=x3+7y^2=x^3+72

The architecture introduces the CLAW instruction set, which exploits the particular Pauli operators generated by the compiled ECDLP circuits. Instead of guaranteeing efficient representatives for every possible Clifford-frame trajectory, the compiler samples and verifies the trajectories encountered by the application. The authors report that all sampled logical operators have accessible physical representatives of weight at most 30.

Three disjoint logical measurements can be executed concurrently when their physical representatives have disjoint supports. This capability is used for CCZ injection, whose three joint logical-y2=x3+7y^2=x^3+73 measurements are executed in a single measurement layer for most gates. In Monte Carlo sampling of compiled circuits, 93.6% of Toffoli gates have measurement depth one, while the remainder have depth two, giving an average depth of 1.07 measurement layers per Toffoli.

Figure 2

Figure 2: Measurement-based routing of an entangling Pauli-controlled-Pauli operation, illustrating the mechanism used to avoid naïve cross-block Clifford decompositions.

The architecture also uses logical CliNR to clear accumulated Clifford frames. Rather than allocating two dedicated Q102 resource blocks for every memory block, the paper pipelines CliNR along the serial structure of the arithmetic. Four additional Q102 blocks suffice, reducing the overhead by approximately 39,200 physical qubits relative to the naïve allocation. Two CliNR instances operate in alternation along the ordered memory register and clear frames while arithmetic proceeds on other blocks.

The authors further replace the baseline loss-propagation model with a swap-loss model. A two-qubit operation involving one lost ion may exchange the loss location with the surviving ion but does not propagate the loss to both locations. A modified leakage-detection unit detects computational, leaked, and lost states under this model. This assumption eliminates loss cascades and reduces each code block from a threefold data-plus-ancilla-plus-beacon allocation to a twofold data-plus-ancilla allocation.

The swap-loss assumption is a substantial architectural dependency. It corresponds physically to sufficiently deep trapping potentials in which a surviving ion is not necessarily ejected after interaction with an empty or damaged site. The authors explicitly acknowledge that the actual behavior depends on the QCCD microarchitecture and requires experimental validation.

Direct CCZ production and measurement parallelism

A major runtime improvement comes from producing CCZ states directly rather than synthesizing Toffoli gates from seven y2=x3+7y^2=x^3+74 states. The dedicated Eastinthillation factory combines zero-level C6 magic-state preparation with Eastin Toffoli-state synthillation. Accepted Toffoli states are converted to CCZ states by a Hadamard on the target.

Figure 3

Figure 3

Figure 3: A Gidney-style ripple adder with measurement-based uncomputation, showing the arithmetic structure exploited by the compiler.

Each factory occupies 319 physical qubits and has an average accepted-state production time of 555.75 POCs. Four factories are sufficient to sustain the application’s consumption rate. The resulting CCZ injection has an average duration of 147.48 POCs, or approximately 29.5 ms. This is reported as a 31-fold speedup relative to the baseline implementation based on sequential y2=x3+7y^2=x^3+75-state injections and Clifford operations.

The factory’s per-attempt restart probability is at most 15.94%, dominated by error-detection rejection rather than undetected logical error. The estimated logical error rate of an accepted CCZ state is at most y2=x3+7y^2=x^3+76. The paper notes that Q66 memory errors dominate this bound by roughly two orders of magnitude over the intrinsic Eastin synthillation contribution. Thus, the quoted factory reliability depends more on the memory-code and decoder model than on the second-order error suppression of the synthillation protocol itself.

The QFT stage requires arbitrary-angle y2=x3+7y^2=x^3+77 rotations synthesized into y2=x3+7y^2=x^3+78 gates. The authors adapt the same factory resources to produce y2=x3+7y^2=x^3+79 states. With an optimized rotation precision of p=2256232977.p=2^{256}-2^{32}-977.0, the expected 464 rotations consume approximately 5,684 p=2256232977.p=2^{256}-2^{32}-977.1-state pairs. The resulting union-bound contribution to failure is at most

p=2256232977.p=2^{256}-2^{32}-977.2

Compiler and integrated routing

The compiler lowers hierarchical component specifications into measurement schedules whose operations are limited to logical Pauli measurements, tracked Clifford updates, and magic-state consumption. Each component has a semantic specification and one or more architecture-specific decompositions. The compiler verifies these decompositions through contracts that describe basis actions, basis-plus-phase actions, or full operators.

For the reversible arithmetic that dominates the application, most verification reduces to classical simulation of basis-state mappings. Small components are exhaustively checked; large approximate components are sampled. For example, the approximate 256-bit modular adder is verified on 100,000 reproducibly sampled input pairs. The schedules are also checked for memory-block capacity, measurement compatibility, magic-state availability, and architectural constraints.

The principal compiler optimization is integrated routing. Instead of decomposing every cross-block CNOT or CZ into a generic three-measurement gadget, the compiler combines logical data movement with neighboring ripple arithmetic. Copy, fanout, move, swap, and measurement-based uncomputation operations are scheduled during periods in which the arithmetic would otherwise leave blocks underutilized.

Figure 4

Figure 4: Integrated routing of the phase-approximate modular adder, with relay operations hidden under the ripple schedule.

For the phase-approximate modular adder, the serial arithmetic lower bound is approximately 669 measurement layers, while the compiled schedule has depth 674. The five-layer difference is hidden by the CliNR seam penalty and the routing schedule. Across the complete point-addition computation, routing contributes only approximately 5% of total runtime. This result directly challenges resource estimates that count Toffoli gates while omitting Clifford gates, measurement-based uncomputation, transport, and layout changes.

The component-level runtime accounting is dominated by in-place multiplication and table lookup:

Component Runtime
In-place multiplication 376.691 h
Unary lookup 179.686 h
Square-subtract 28.339 h
Unary phase-fix lookup 11.205 h
CliNR operations 10.255 h
Other arithmetic, routing, and iQFT 0.440 h
Initial lookup and setup 8.938 h
Total 616.555 h

The two dominant components account for more than 90% of the reported runtime. This distribution implies that further reductions in Toffoli count would not automatically translate into proportional wall-clock improvements unless they also shorten the serial measurement schedules of multiplication and lookup.

Device-level resource estimate

The final device contains 69 Q102 memory blocks, four Q102 CliNR blocks, 24 mobile cat-state bundle pairs, 12 Bell-state bundles for LM2 measurements, four Eastinthillation factories, and a 34-ion global loading reservoir.

Figure 5

Figure 5: Full-scale p=2256232977.p=2^{256}-2^{32}-977.3 trapped-ion device, including Q102 memory, CliNR resources, cat-state factories, Bell-state bundles, magic factories, and ion reservoirs.

The physical-qubit allocation is

Allocation Physical qubits
69 Q102 memory blocks 14,283
24 cat-state bundle pairs 2,880
Bell-state bundles 96
Four Q102 CliNR blocks 828
Four Eastinthillation factories 1,276
Global loading reservoir 34
Total 19,397

The cat-state reduction is particularly large. The naïve architecture would provision cat-state resources locally for every memory block. The proposed mobile bundle scheme provisions only the peak measurement parallelism and transports bundles between target blocks. For the three simultaneous measurements needed by CCZ injection, two bundles per measurement stream suffice, yielding a factor of 36.5 reduction in the spatial cat-state overhead relative to the default local allocation.

The compiled measurement depth corresponds to an expected runtime of approximately 616.555 hours, or 25.690 days, when every layer is conservatively charged at the 29.5 ms CCZ-injection duration. This is explicitly an upper-bound-style assignment: many non-Toffoli measurement layers are shorter, but the paper charges them at the longest critical-path duration.

The logical failure budget includes Q102 memory errors, logical measurement errors, CCZ-state errors, QFT p=2256232977.p=2^{256}-2^{32}-977.4-state errors, and reservoir exhaustion. The reported aggregate logical failure probability is approximately 26.45%, implying an end-to-end hardware survival probability near 73.55%. Combining this with the algorithmic success estimates yields the 40.7% rigorous-style and 63.3% heuristic single-shot probabilities.

Limitations and open questions

The principal limitations concern the modeling assumptions rather than the logical circuit construction.

First, the physical resource estimate depends on the swap-loss model. The model prevents loss cascades and permits a lower-overhead leakage-detection protocol, but the paper does not establish experimentally that the relevant trapped-ion QCCD operations satisfy this model. The authors explicitly leave the detailed heating, ejection, and reloading dynamics to future microarchitectural analysis.

Second, several reliability estimates are extrapolated. Q102 and Q66 logical error rates at p=2256232977.p=2^{256}-2^{32}-977.5 are inferred from simulations at higher physical error rates using a fitted fifth-order ansatz. The binary-gcd failure bound is Monte Carlo-based and assumes a uniform input distribution before applying a structural correction for elliptic-curve inputs. These procedures are quantitatively explicit, but they are not substitutes for exhaustive verification over the full input domain.

Third, the architecture uses application-specific sampling to establish that all encountered Clifford-frame trajectories have accessible low-weight physical representatives. The reported confidence bound is p=2256232977.p=2^{256}-2^{32}-977.6 per component for an inaccessible trajectory after 10,000 samples, not a formal proof over all trajectories. The performance claims therefore depend on the adequacy of this sampling procedure.

Fourth, the runtime estimate charges every logical measurement layer at CCZ-injection duration. This is conservative, but it obscures the sensitivity of the result to the detailed distribution of measurement types and classical feed-forward delays. Conversely, the estimate assumes that transport, factory throughput, and reloading can sustain the compiled schedule without unmodeled control-system bottlenecks.

Finally, the reported 63.3% success probability is heuristic because it uses Ekerå’s ideal-oracle success estimate. The more conservative bound is 40.7%. The paper therefore does not establish a single unconditional probability of successfully recovering the discrete logarithm; it provides a rigorous-style lower estimate under one postprocessing bound and a higher heuristic estimate under another.

Conclusion

The paper develops a complete architecture-aware estimate for a fault-tolerant trapped-ion implementation of Shor’s ECDLP algorithm on p=2256232977.p=2^{256}-2^{32}-977.7. Its main quantitative result is a 25.7-day, 19,397-physical-qubit implementation with approximately 39 million Toffoli gates, based on 1,457 logical qubits and a specialized quantum LDPC architecture. The reduction from prior trapped-ion estimates is produced by coordinated improvements: pseudo-Mersenne arithmetic, conditionally inverted adders, Karatsuba squaring, randomized approximate-oracle analysis, direct CCZ factories, depth-one CCZ injection, mobile cat-state resources, logical CliNR, integrated routing, and an altered ion-loss model.

The strongest methodological contribution is the replacement of gate-count extrapolation with executable measurement schedules that include Clifford operations, routing, transport, magic-state throughput, leakage, loss, and memory occupancy. The central open issue is whether the assumed trapped-ion noise and loss model, together with the compiler’s sampled logical-operator accessibility guarantees, can be validated at the scale required by the estimate.

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1. What is this paper about?

This paper studies how a future fault-tolerant quantum computer might break a difficult mathematical problem used to protect systems such as Bitcoin.

The problem is called the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem, or ECDLP. It is based on calculations with points on a special mathematical shape called an elliptic curve. Classical computers find this problem extremely difficult when the numbers are large.

The authors use Shor’s algorithm, a quantum algorithm designed to solve certain problems much faster than ordinary computers. They estimate that a specially designed trapped-ion quantum computer could solve the 256-bit ECDLP problem used by Bitcoin in about:

  • 25.7 days
  • Using about 19,397 physical qubits
  • With an estimated success chance of about 63% per attempt

These are computer-resource estimates, not the results of an experiment on a working machine.

2. What questions are the researchers asking?

The paper mainly asks:

  • How many qubits would be needed to solve the 256-bit ECDLP?
  • How long would the calculation take on a realistic trapped-ion quantum computer?
  • Can the quantum circuit be made smaller and faster?
  • How can the computer protect its calculations from errors?
  • What is the chance that one complete run gives the correct answer?
  • How much do real-world problems—such as moving ions, measuring qubits, and correcting errors—slow the calculation down?

The researchers focus on the curve called secp256k1, which is important because it is used in Bitcoin and other blockchain systems.

3. How did the researchers do their work?

The authors did not build the complete machine. Instead, they designed the quantum circuit and used mathematical analysis and computer simulations to estimate what a real machine would need.

The basic algorithm

Shor’s algorithm searches for hidden patterns in a mathematical calculation. In this paper, the calculation involves adding points on an elliptic curve.

A simplified version of the problem is:

Given a point PP and another point QQ, find the number dd such that Q=[d]PQ = [d]P.

Here, [d]P[d]P means adding the point PP to itself dd times. Finding dd is easy if it is already known, but finding it from PP and QQ is extremely difficult for a classical computer.

A quantum computer can use superposition—similar to trying many possibilities at once—and a quantum Fourier transform, which helps reveal the hidden pattern.

Making the calculation practical

The researchers divided the large calculation into smaller pieces called windows. This is like solving a long multiplication problem in groups of digits instead of handling every digit at once.

They also used several improvements:

  • They reduced the number of expensive Toffoli gates, which are quantum operations involving three qubits.
  • They created faster ways to perform these gates using special prepared quantum states.
  • They designed a compiler that turns the abstract quantum circuit into instructions that obey the rules of the proposed hardware.
  • They included the time needed to move ions, measure qubits, route information, and correct errors.
  • They used random offsets to make calculation failures more evenly spread out and easier to analyze.
  • They used approximate arithmetic. This saves time and gates, but it introduces a small chance of getting a wrong result.

Error correction

Quantum states are fragile. Small disturbances can change the answer, just as a tiny mistake in a long calculation can cause the final answer to be wrong.

The proposed machine uses quantum error correction. This stores information in groups of physical qubits so that errors can be detected and corrected. The paper uses special error-correcting codes called quantum LDPC codes.

The machine is based on trapped ions. In this type of computer, individual atoms are used as qubits. The ions can be moved around a two-dimensional grid so that qubits that need to interact can be brought close together.

4. What are the main findings?

Fewer quantum operations

The authors reduced the estimated number of Toffoli gates from roughly 58 million to 39 million.

A Toffoli gate is a basic building block for many quantum calculations. Fewer gates generally means less time and fewer opportunities for errors.

The improved circuit uses about 1,457 logical qubits. A logical qubit is a reliable qubit made by combining several less-reliable physical qubits.

A proposed machine with about 20,000 physical qubits

After adding the qubits needed for error correction, memory, communication, special resource factories, and other support systems, the total estimate becomes:

Quantity Estimate
Physical qubits 19,397
Logical qubits About 1,450
Toffoli gates About 39 million
Runtime per attempt About 25.7 days
Estimated success probability About 63%

A physical qubit is an actual hardware qubit. A logical qubit is protected information spread across multiple physical qubits.

Faster Toffoli gates

The paper introduces a special magic-state factory. Despite its unusual name, this is not a factory in the ordinary sense. It is a part of the quantum computer that prepares special temporary quantum states needed for difficult operations.

The authors also design a faster way to use these states. Together, these changes reduce the estimated time for a Toffoli gate by a factor of about 31 compared with a simpler implementation.

Including real hardware costs

Many earlier estimates counted only the main quantum gates. This paper tries to be more realistic by also counting:

  • Moving ions between locations
  • Measuring qubits
  • Correcting errors
  • Routing information between parts of the machine
  • Preparing special quantum states
  • Handling lost or leaked ions
  • Waiting for operations to finish

The authors estimate that routing adds only about 5% to the total runtime in their design.

Probability of success

The paper gives two types of success estimates:

  • A more conservative mathematical estimate gives about 40.7% success for one attempt.
  • A more optimistic estimate based on a commonly used heuristic gives about 63.3% success.

The difference exists because the exact behavior of the approximate circuits and the later classical processing is difficult to describe with one single number.

If five identical machines ran independently at the same time, using the 63.3% estimate, the chance that at least one machine succeeded would rise to about 99.3%.

5. Why are these results important?

The results suggest that breaking the elliptic-curve security used by Bitcoin might eventually require far fewer quantum resources than some earlier estimates suggested.

Earlier trapped-ion proposals sometimes required millions of physical qubits. This paper estimates that a more specialized design could reduce that number to about 20,000.

That does not mean that such a machine exists today. A computer with nearly 20,000 reliable, error-corrected qubits is far beyond current large-scale quantum computers. The 25.7-day result depends on many assumptions about future hardware, error rates, ion movement, and error-correction methods.

The paper’s main contribution is therefore a detailed engineering plan and resource estimate. It shows how improvements in:

  • Quantum algorithms
  • Circuit design
  • Error correction
  • Hardware layout
  • Qubit movement
  • Compilation
  • Parallel operations

can work together to make a very difficult quantum calculation more realistic.

Simple conclusion

In short, the paper designs a possible future quantum computer that could use Shor’s algorithm to solve the mathematical problem protecting Bitcoin’s elliptic-curve keys. The authors estimate that it would need around 20,000 physical qubits and about 26 days for one attempt.

The research is important because it helps scientists understand how much progress quantum computers still need before they could threaten current cryptographic systems. If machines of this kind become practical, systems such as Bitcoin and other online security tools may need to switch to post-quantum cryptography—encryption designed to remain secure even against powerful quantum computers.

Knowledge Gaps

Knowledge gaps, limitations, and open questions

The paper leaves the following issues unresolved or insufficiently established:

  • Experimental validation of the assumed trapped-ion parameters is missing. The architecture relies on two-qubit error rates of 10410^{-4}, single-qubit error rates of 10510^{-5}, millisecond-scale syndrome extraction, ion transport, leakage correction, and qubit reloading, but these parameters are not demonstrated together in a device of the required scale.
  • The scalability of the QCCD layout to 19,397 physical qubits is unverified. It remains unclear whether a large two-dimensional trapped-ion system can maintain the assumed transport fidelity, control precision, connectivity, calibration stability, and loading efficiency over 26 days.
  • Correlations between physical faults are not analyzed. The logical-error estimate appears to rely primarily on aggregate logical error rates, without quantifying correlated errors caused by shared control electronics, motional modes, transport operations, syndrome-extraction hardware, or simultaneous measurements.
  • The effect of time-dependent noise is unresolved. The analysis does not establish whether gate, measurement, transport, heating, leakage, and memory-error rates remain constant during a 25.7-day computation.
  • The logical error probability is not independently validated at the full circuit scale. The reported 26.45%26.45\% logical-failure probability is an estimate, but the paper does not provide a full fault-injection simulation or experiment covering the complete sequence of factories, routing, measurements, memory storage, and error-correction cycles.
  • The loss and leakage model requires further validation. The proposed loss-correction unit eliminates beacon qubits, but the assumptions about loss detection, correction latency, reload success, and the impact of repeated loss events are not experimentally substantiated.
  • The interaction between loss correction and encoded quantum information is not fully characterized. In particular, the paper does not quantify whether loss-recovery operations introduce correlated logical errors or disrupt the scheduling and fault-tolerance assumptions of Q102 blocks.
  • The performance of the CCZ factory under realistic operating conditions is uncertain. The factory is assumed to produce states with logical error below 10910^{-9} and an average production time below 28 ms, but variability, transient failures, factory startup costs, resource-state storage, and correlated factory failures are not analyzed in detail.
  • The assumption of a continuous supply of Toffoli states is not stress-tested. Average factory throughput may be insufficient if stochastic production delays coincide across factories or if the circuit’s instantaneous demand differs substantially from its average demand.
  • The depth-one CCZ injection protocol is not compared against a complete fault-tolerant implementation. The paper does not quantify all required ancilla preparation, verification, feed-forward, Pauli-frame updates, and recovery operations under realistic classical-control latency.
  • Classical control and decoding times are largely unspecified. The runtime estimate does not clearly account for syndrome decoding, measurement processing, adaptive feed-forward, mask generation, table management, or communication latency between control subsystems.
  • The conservative measurement-time assumption may not be tight. Treating every logical measurement as taking as long as a Toffoli injection simplifies the estimate, but the paper does not determine how much runtime could be recovered using operation-specific measurement schedules.
  • The claimed 25.7-day runtime is not robustly quantified under parameter uncertainty. No sensitivity analysis is provided for syndrome-extraction time, transport time, logical error rates, factory throughput, measurement latency, or routing overhead.
  • The physical-qubit footprint is architecture-specific and not directly comparable across platforms. The reported 19,397-qubit figure depends on particular Q102, cat-factory, CliNR, and transport assumptions; the paper does not provide a standardized accounting that separates data, ancilla, factory, control, spare, and reloading resources.
  • Dynamic resource reallocation is not explored quantitatively. The paper keeps the device configuration fixed, leaving unresolved how much the qubit count or runtime could be reduced by reallocating memory, factory, cat-state, and CliNR resources during different algorithmic phases.
  • The tradeoff between qubit count and runtime is incomplete. Only one principal architecture point is emphasized; alternative numbers of factories, memory blocks, cat resources, and parallel measurement channels are not systematically optimized.
  • The compiler’s reproducibility is limited by missing implementation details. The paper describes an internal compilation and verification toolchain but does not provide sufficient code, input data, schedules, benchmarks, or machine-readable circuit descriptions to independently reproduce the depth and qubit counts.
  • Compiler optimality is not established. The reported layout and routing costs may be improved by alternative qubit-placement, scheduling, routing, or resource-allocation strategies; the claimed 5% routing overhead is not shown to be close to optimal.
  • The reported Toffoli count is partly heuristic. The point-addition count is based on the largest count observed in 100 runs, rather than an analytically proven worst-case count, leaving uncertainty about rare high-cost instances.
  • The stochastic penalty layers are not fully characterized. The table reports average penalty layers, but the variance, tail behavior, and probability of unusually long executions are not given, even though these may affect wall-clock completion time.
  • The approximate-arithmetic failure bound depends on Monte Carlo sampling. The bound pf0.0335p_f\leq 0.0335 has confidence 121281-2^{-128}, but the paper does not provide enough information about the sample size, sampling protocol, independence assumptions, or statistical method to assess this claim.
  • The failure analysis may not cover all implementation-level faults. The mathematical failure set includes arithmetic and phase errors, but the relationship between this model and failures caused by routing, measurements, leakage, loss, factory errors, and compiler-generated schedules is not fully formalized.
  • The independence assumptions used to combine algorithmic and logical failures are insufficiently discussed. The final success probabilities appear to combine approximate-oracle success with logical-failure estimates, but possible correlations between circuit regions and error mechanisms are not quantified.
  • The random-mask analysis does not establish practical randomness requirements. It proves an averaged success guarantee over masks, but the number of masks, their generation cost, their storage, and the robustness of the guarantee under imperfect or biased sampling are not addressed.
  • The distinction between rigorous and heuristic success probabilities remains substantial. The end-to-end success estimate ranges from 40.7%40.7\% to 63.3%63.3\%, because the latter depends on Ekerå’s heuristic estimate; the paper does not resolve which value should govern practical provisioning.
  • The success probability of the classical postprocessing is not experimentally evaluated for the exact truncated-window configuration. Removing the final three windows and recovering 48 bits classically may have instance-dependent behavior that is not captured by the cited heuristic.
  • The impact of malformed or adversarial ECDLP instances is unexplored. The analysis focuses on the fixed secp256k1 setting and does not establish whether the arithmetic approximations, masks, and success bounds remain valid uniformly over all valid inputs Q=[d]PQ=[d]P.
  • Generalization beyond secp256k1 is limited. It is unclear how the architecture and circuit optimizations change for curves without pseudo-Mersenne primes, different subgroup orders, different coordinate systems, or higher security levels.
  • The security interpretation is incomplete. The paper estimates the cost of solving one ECDLP instance but does not analyze key-recovery workflows, public-key availability, transaction timing, parallel-device deployment, or the economic implications of repeated attacks against blockchain systems.
  • The effect of multiple parallel devices on shared infrastructure is not examined. The claimed increase to 99.3% success with five devices assumes independent failures, but common-mode hardware, software, calibration, and fabrication failures could invalidate that assumption.
  • Classical postprocessing cost is omitted from the end-to-end resource assessment. The paper does not quantify the processor, memory, runtime, and communication requirements for processing measurement data and recovering the discrete logarithm.
  • The initial lookup and large table-management requirements are not fully assessed. The 2182^{18} lookup is included in circuit depth, but the classical generation, storage, loading, addressing, and fault-tolerant interaction with the table are not analyzed in comparable detail.
  • The lifetime and maintenance requirements of the computation are unresolved. A 26-day run may require recalibration, replacement or reloading of ions, software intervention, and recovery from nonfatal faults, none of which are included in the runtime or success model.
  • The architecture’s tolerance to component failures is not studied. The paper does not specify whether individual memory blocks, factories, transport zones, measurement channels, or control modules can fail gracefully without restarting the entire computation.
  • The paper does not identify the dominant bottleneck under realistic, rather than nominal, hardware conditions. It is unclear whether runtime would be limited by Toffoli-state production, measurements, syndrome extraction, ion transport, decoding, classical control, or memory reliability once experimental overheads are included.
  • The long-term stability of reusable cat-state and CliNR resources is not quantified. Reuse and transport of these resources could introduce accumulated errors or scheduling constraints that are not represented in the resource estimate.
  • The claimed simplicity-versus-optimization tradeoff is not quantified. The paper notes that alternative adders, more classical postprocessing, parallel runs, and dynamic allocation could improve the design, but it does not determine the achievable reductions in qubits, runtime, or total expected time to solution.**

Practical Applications

Immediate Applications

  • Post-quantum cryptography planning and migration — cybersecurity, finance, blockchain, government
    • Use the paper’s end-to-end estimate—approximately 19,397 physical qubits, 25.7 days per attempt, and an estimated 40.7–63.3% single-run success probability—as a concrete scenario for assessing when quantum attacks against secp256k1 may become operationally relevant.
    • Organizations using Bitcoin, other cryptocurrencies, hardware wallets, digital signatures, or elliptic-curve key exchange can use the result to:
    • inventory systems relying on ECDSA or related elliptic-curve primitives;
    • prioritize migration to post-quantum signature and key-establishment schemes;
    • estimate the urgency of address/key rotation and long-term asset protection;
    • define quantum-readiness milestones for cryptographic infrastructure.
    • Dependencies and assumptions: the estimate is architectural rather than an experimental demonstration. It assumes fault-tolerant trapped-ion hardware, two-qubit error rates near 10410^{-4}, single-qubit error rates near 10510^{-5}, successful quantum error correction, adequate qubit transport, and the availability of the proposed magic-state factories.
  • Cryptographic risk analysis and security-budget modeling — policy, standards, risk management
    • Security teams and standards bodies can incorporate this resource estimate into threat models for 256-bit elliptic-curve systems. The paper provides a more detailed input than abstract statements that “large-scale quantum computers may break ECC.”
    • Possible outputs include:
    • quantum-risk dashboards comparing cryptographic schemes by estimated physical-qubit and runtime requirements;
    • transition deadlines based on the expected lifetime of encrypted data and blockchain assets;
    • procurement requirements for quantum-resistant hardware and software;
    • stress tests for cryptocurrency consensus and wallet security.
    • Dependencies and assumptions: the result applies specifically to secp256k1 and does not directly establish equivalent costs for every elliptic curve, signature protocol, or implementation. Hardware progress, code improvements, and parallelization could lower the practical attack threshold.
  • Benchmarking fault-tolerant quantum-computing architectures — quantum hardware and systems engineering
    • The complete compilation pipeline can serve as a benchmark for trapped-ion quantum-computer proposals. Rather than comparing devices only by qubit count or gate fidelity, researchers and vendors can compare:
    • logical measurement depth;
    • magic-state production rate;
    • qubit transport and routing overhead;
    • leakage, loss, and reloading costs;
    • logical failure probability;
    • total wall-clock time for a cryptographically meaningful workload.
    • The paper’s executable architecture-legal schedules could inform prototype compiler tests, architecture simulators, and hardware roadmaps.
    • Dependencies and assumptions: the schedules depend on the Walking Cat architecture, its QCCD transport model, quantum LDPC codes, and proposed logical operations. Reproducing the estimate requires access to the compiler, detailed device parameters, and the complete error model.
  • Quantum compiler verification and resource estimation — software and academia
    • The compiler methodology can be used to build tools that lower high-level quantum algorithms into architecture-constrained measurement schedules while accounting for routing, measurements, ancillas, and resource-state allocation.
    • A practical workflow could be:
    • 1. specify an arithmetic or cryptographic circuit at the logical level;
    • 2. assign logical qubits to memory blocks;
    • 3. integrate routing with neighboring operations;
    • 4. schedule measurements and magic-state injections;
    • 5. estimate physical qubits, depth, runtime, and failure probability;
    • 6. verify that the generated schedule obeys the architectural instruction set.
    • Such tooling is relevant to quantum software vendors, compiler researchers, hardware co-design teams, and academic benchmarking.
    • Dependencies and assumptions: accurate results require calibrated operation times, realistic syndrome-extraction schedules, and validated models of transport, loss, leakage, and logical error correction.
  • Validation of approximate quantum arithmetic — quantum algorithm research
    • The random offset-mask technique and the analysis of computational-basis and phase errors provide a reusable method for validating approximate arithmetic inside period-finding algorithms.
    • Researchers can apply the approach to:
    • modular multiplication and inversion;
    • elliptic-curve point addition;
    • approximate modular reduction;
    • measurement-based uncomputation;
    • other quantum arithmetic circuits where a small set of inputs may fail.
    • The method is particularly useful when replacing informal “small error” arguments with per-input failure bounds and an end-to-end success-probability estimate.
    • Dependencies and assumptions: the proof requires suitable randomization of exceptional inputs and an error model in which failures can be identified or bounded. It does not automatically cover correlated hardware errors or arbitrary coherent noise.
  • Cryptographic education and workforce training — education and academia
    • The paper can support advanced courses and laboratory exercises covering:
    • Shor’s algorithm for ECDLP;
    • quantum resource estimation;
    • fault-tolerant architecture;
    • quantum LDPC codes;
    • magic-state factories;
    • quantum compilation and routing;
    • the distinction between logical and physical qubits.
    • Students could reproduce smaller versions of the workflow, compare surface-code and trapped-ion assumptions, or study how Toffoli-count reductions translate—or fail to translate—into runtime reductions.
    • Dependencies and assumptions: full-scale reproduction is not currently practical, so educational use would generally rely on simulation, reduced circuits, or analytical models.
  • Blockchain and digital-asset preparedness — software engineering and finance
    • Blockchain developers can use the result to test migration workflows for systems based on ECDSA and secp256k1, including:
    • support for post-quantum signatures;
    • hybrid classical/post-quantum transactions;
    • key rotation and address migration;
    • custody-provider recovery procedures;
    • monitoring for quantum-capable adversaries.
    • The paper’s demonstration that one attack attempt can be repeated or parallelized also supports operational risk models: five independent devices would raise the stated heuristic success probability to approximately 99.3%.
    • Dependencies and assumptions: parallel-device calculations assume independent failures and comparable hardware. Blockchain migration also depends on protocol governance, user participation, transaction throughput, and the availability of standardized post-quantum schemes.

Long-Term Applications

  • Practical quantum attacks on secp256k1-based systems — blockchain, cryptocurrency, digital identity
    • If the proposed architecture or a comparable fault-tolerant system is realized and scaled, the workflow could be used to recover private keys from exposed public keys by solving the ECDLP.
    • Potential targets include:
    • Bitcoin or other secp256k1 transactions whose public keys are visible;
    • dormant addresses with reusable public keys;
    • digital-signature systems using the same curve;
    • legacy devices and long-lived identity credentials.
    • The relevant product or service could be a cryptanalytic quantum-computing platform capable of running specialized ECDLP workloads.
    • Dependencies and assumptions: this requires major advances in trapped-ion scaling, quantum error correction, qubit transport, magic-state production, device uptime, and classical postprocessing. The paper is a resource estimate, not evidence that such an attack is currently feasible.
  • Automated quantum security evaluation services — cybersecurity and compliance
    • Future security vendors could offer a “quantum attackability assessment” that accepts a cryptographic deployment and estimates:
    • the relevant quantum algorithm;
    • logical qubit and physical qubit requirements;
    • runtime per attempt;
    • expected success after repetition or parallel execution;
    • sensitivity to hardware improvements.
    • The compiler and probability-analysis techniques in the paper could form the basis of a workload-specific security calculator rather than relying on generic qubit-count estimates.
    • Dependencies and assumptions: such a service would need validated implementations for multiple curves and cryptographic protocols, reliable hardware characterization, and agreement on conservative versus heuristic success estimates.
  • General-purpose trapped-ion fault-tolerant quantum computers — quantum hardware
    • The architecture innovations could contribute to future devices supporting:
    • dense quantum LDPC memory blocks;
    • movable ions and long-range connectivity;
    • reusable cat-state resources;
    • high-throughput CCZ or Toffoli factories;
    • integrated logical routing;
    • leakage and loss correction;
    • recycled ancilla qubits.
    • These features could improve workloads beyond ECDLP, including chemistry simulation, optimization, linear algebra, and cryptanalysis, especially when circuits contain many non-Clifford operations and measurements.
    • Dependencies and assumptions: the proposed improvements must be demonstrated experimentally, including reliable transport under fault-tolerant operation, sufficiently low physical error rates, stable syndrome extraction, and scalable fabrication and control infrastructure.
  • Reusable CCZ/Toffoli resource factories — quantum-computing infrastructure
    • The proposed fast CCZ factory and depth-one injection mechanism could evolve into reusable hardware and compiler modules for non-Clifford-heavy applications.
    • Possible products include:
    • standalone magic-state factory designs;
    • compiler libraries for CCZ-state scheduling;
    • resource-allocation engines that match factory output to circuit demand;
    • architecture-specific instruction sets for Toffoli-dominant algorithms.
    • The techniques may be valuable wherever Toffoli width is low but total Toffoli count is large.
    • Dependencies and assumptions: the claimed performance depends on the logical error rate, factory throughput, cat-state parallelism, and the ability to maintain a continuous supply without increasing the physical-qubit footprint excessively.
  • Quantum LDPC-based memory and computing subsystems — hardware and architecture research
    • The Q102-style dense encoding and the removal of beacon-qubit overhead could motivate memory subsystems that store many logical qubits per physical-qubit block.
    • Long-term applications include:
    • compact logical memories;
    • modular quantum-computer tiles;
    • dynamically allocated memory and gate regions;
    • architecture-level scheduling of transport, storage, and error correction.
    • Dependencies and assumptions: quantum LDPC codes must achieve the required logical error rates under realistic trapped-ion transport and measurement noise. The benefits may vary substantially for circuits with greater parallel gate width or different connectivity patterns.
  • Automated co-design of algorithms, compilers, and hardware — academia and industry
    • The paper illustrates a full-stack optimization loop: elliptic-curve arithmetic is modified to reduce Toffoli cost; the compiler integrates routing; the architecture is adapted to the circuit’s measurement parallelism; and the physical layout is optimized around workload structure.
    • Future tools could automatically explore:
    • arithmetic representations;
    • adder and multiplier families;
    • window sizes;
    • logical layouts;
    • factory counts;
    • memory-block allocation;
    • routing strategies;
    • repetition versus per-instance qubit footprint.
    • Dependencies and assumptions: automated optimization requires formal circuit specifications, architecture-aware cost models, scalable verification, and objective functions that include runtime, qubits, energy, error probability, and manufacturing constraints.
  • Broader quantum cryptanalysis of public-key systems — government, intelligence, finance
    • The methods could be generalized to estimate attacks on other elliptic curves, finite-field discrete logarithms, and possibly larger or alternative cryptographic groups.
    • This could support:
    • national cryptographic-transition planning;
    • evaluation of digital-signature standards;
    • protection of long-lived classified information;
    • prioritization of systems vulnerable to “harvest now, decrypt later” strategies.
    • Dependencies and assumptions: each target requires new arithmetic circuits, curve-specific optimizations, success-probability analysis, and architecture-specific compilation. The special pseudo-Mersenne structure of secp256k1 means its costs should not be generalized without further study.
  • High-assurance verification of large quantum algorithms — formal methods and software
    • The paper’s verification pipeline could evolve into a formal assurance framework that checks:
    • equivalence between high-level arithmetic and compiled schedules;
    • correctness of approximate oracles;
    • handling of exceptional cases;
    • resource-state consumption;
    • logical error and success-probability bounds;
    • compliance with architectural constraints.
    • Such systems could become necessary for safety-critical, financially significant, or cryptanalytic quantum workloads.
    • Dependencies and assumptions: formal verification must scale to circuits involving tens of millions of Toffoli gates and must model probabilistic measurements, leakage, transport failures, and approximate arithmetic without making the verification process impractical.
  • Quantum-accelerated scientific and industrial computation using the same architecture principles — chemistry, materials, optimization, data science
    • Although the paper studies cryptanalysis, its innovations in resource-state production, measurement scheduling, logical routing, and dense error-corrected memory could transfer to other fault-tolerant workloads.
    • Potential future workflows include chemistry simulations with large numbers of controlled operations, optimization algorithms requiring repeated non-Clifford subroutines, and scientific simulations whose performance is limited by magic-state throughput.
    • Dependencies and assumptions: transfer is not automatic. Other applications may have higher parallelism, different qubit lifetimes, more demanding connectivity, or greater sensitivity to measurement and routing overheads than the ECDLP circuit.

Glossary

  • Abelian group: A group whose operation is commutative. “is an abelian group with neutral element OO
  • Approximate arithmetic: Arithmetic computation deliberately implemented with limited precision or omitted cases to reduce resource costs. “All state-of-the-art implementations of Shor's algorithm have to deal with superpositions that contain a number of failed computations due to the use of optimizations such as approximate arithmetic”
  • Approximate oracle: An oracle operation that computes an approximation to the desired mathematical function. “This section considers the success probability of a single run of Shor's algorithm for the ECDLP using an approximate oracle”
  • Binary gcd: A greatest-common-divisor algorithm based on subtraction and division by powers of two rather than general division. “we applied to the implementation of the binary gcd circuit”
  • CCZ state injection: A fault-tolerant procedure for applying a controlled-controlled-ZZ operation using a prepared ancillary quantum state. “a depth-one CCZ state injection”
  • Cat state: An entangled state used to distribute a measurement or control operation across multiple qubits. “we increase the logical-measurement parallelism using non-overlapping cat-based measurements in parallel”
  • Classical postprocessing: Classical computation performed after quantum measurements to extract or refine the algorithm’s result. “Classical postprocessing~\cite{ekeraa2019revisiting,litinski2023compute} is then used to recover the $48$ bits”
  • Clifford frame: A classical representation tracking how Clifford operations transform the interpretation of encoded Pauli operators. “it is challenging to perform multiple logical operations at once in the same block given an arbitrary Clifford frame”
  • Clifford gate: A quantum gate that maps Pauli operators to Pauli operators under conjugation and can be efficiently tracked classically. “we replace all naive Clifford decompositions with integrated logical routing”
  • CliNR: A protocol for simplifying or tracking Clifford operations in a fault-tolerant quantum architecture. “we leverage the recently proposed logical CliNR protocol to speed up Clifford operations”
  • Computational-basis error: An error that changes the classical bit-string represented by a quantum state. “phase as well as computational basis errors”
  • Conditionally-inverted addition: An addition operation that applies either an operation or its inverse depending on a control condition. “controlled additions become conditionally-inverted additions”
  • Controlled operation: A quantum operation applied conditionally on the state of one or more control qubits. “controlled operations are sometimes more expensive than conditional adjoint operations”
  • Controlled-controlled-ZZ (CCZ): A three-qubit diagonal gate that applies a phase of 1-1 only to the 111\lvert111\rangle state. “Our magic factory directly produces CCZ states”
  • Double-scalar multiplication: The elliptic-curve operation computing a linear combination of two scalar multiples of points. “the quantum operation UfU_f that represents the double scalar multiplication”
  • ECDLP: The problem of finding a scalar dd such that Q=[d]PQ=[d]P on an elliptic-curve group. “solving the $256$-bit elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP)”
  • Elliptic curve: A set of points satisfying a cubic equation, equipped with a group operation. “Let E:y2=x3+ax+bE: y^2 = x^3 + ax + b for a,bFpa,b \in F_p be an elliptic curve”
  • Fault-tolerant quantum computing: Quantum computation designed to continue reliably despite physical noise through error correction and redundancy. “a fault-tolerant trapped-ion quantum computer”
  • Finite field: A finite algebraic field in which addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division are defined. “elliptic curves defined over large characteristic finite fields”
  • Frobenius trace: The integer describing the deviation of the number of points on an elliptic curve over a finite field from the field size plus one. “where tt is the trace of Frobenius”
  • Hidden subgroup problem: The problem of identifying a subgroup from a function that is constant on its cosets. “The ECDLP is a special case of period finding and the hidden subgroup problem”
  • Inverse quantum Fourier transform (iQFT): The inverse of the quantum Fourier transform, used to convert phase information into measurable computational information. “including the semi-classical inverse quantum Fourier transforms (iQFT)”
  • Karatsuba multiplication: A recursive multiplication method that reduces the number of large multiplications by splitting operands into parts. “we build a modular squarer for pseudo-Mersenne primes based on a single Karatsuba split”
  • Leakage correction: Error correction for population escaping the intended computational states of a physical qubit. “we introduce a new leakage and loss correction unit”
  • Logical measurement: A measurement of an encoded logical qubit rather than its individual physical constituents. “each TT state injection consumes a logical measurement”
  • Logical qubit: A noise-protected qubit encoded across multiple physical qubits. “with a rigorous lower bound on the logical-level success probability”
  • Logical error rate: The probability that an encoded operation or qubit experiences an uncorrected error. “with logical error rate below~10910^{-9}
  • Logical instruction set architecture (ISA): The set of logical operations supported directly by a quantum error-correction architecture. “using its logical instruction set architecture (ISA)”
  • Magic-state factory: A fault-tolerant circuit that prepares special ancillary states used to implement non-Clifford gates. “The magic factories of \cite{tripier2026walkingcat} produce TT states”
  • Measurement-based uncomputation: Reversing a computation by measuring temporary registers and applying classically controlled corrections. “the measurement-based uncomputation of temporary ANDs”
  • Modular reduction: Mapping an integer to its remainder modulo a specified modulus. “the approximate modular reduction”
  • Non-Clifford gate: A quantum gate outside the Clifford group, generally requiring special resources for fault-tolerant implementation. “which are about half as costly in terms of non-Clifford gates”
  • Phase error: An error in the relative complex phase between components of a quantum superposition. “This introduces phase errors in addition to arithmetic errors”
  • Phase estimation: A quantum procedure for estimating the eigenphase of a unitary operator. “the final $3$ phase estimation windows”
  • Point at infinity: The identity element of an elliptic-curve group, commonly denoted OO. “the point at infinity OO
  • Pseudo-Mersenne prime: A prime close to a power of two, typically of the form 2nc2^n-c for a small cc. “its prime is pseudo-Mersenne”
  • Quantum error-correcting code: An encoding that protects logical quantum information from physical noise. “complete descriptions of all logical operations, quantum error-correcting codes, and error-correction circuits”
  • Quantum Fourier transform (QFT): The quantum analogue of the discrete Fourier transform, used to extract periodicity or phase information. “The ECDLP is a special case of period finding and the hidden subgroup problem and uses the quantum Fourier transform (QFT)”
  • Quantum LDPC code: A quantum low-density parity-check code with sparse stabilizer checks. “it is the first ECDLP architecture for trapped ions based on quantum LDPC codes”
  • Quantum state injection: The process of using an ancillary resource state and measurements to implement a desired logical gate. “we include multiple cat factories per block and we perform parallel logical operations”
  • Relative-phase Toffoli: A Toffoli-like operation that reproduces the correct computational-basis action while allowing additional relative phases. “the relative-phase-Toffoli-based four-TT constructions”
  • Syndrome extraction: Measuring error syndromes to determine which errors have occurred without measuring the encoded quantum information. “the syndrome extraction circuit”
  • Table lookup: A reversible operation that selects a classically precomputed value based on a quantum index. “we replace the first windowed point addition by a direct table lookup”
  • Toffoli gate: A three-qubit controlled-controlled-NOT gate that flips a target when both controls are $1$. “with 4010640\cdot 10^6 Toffoli gates”
  • Toffoli state: A resource state used to implement Toffoli or equivalent non-Clifford operations fault-tolerantly. “Four Toffoli factories consuming a total of 1276=43191276 = 4 \cdot 319 qubits are enough to produce Toffoli states”
  • Toffoli width: The maximum number of Toffoli gates that can be executed concurrently in a circuit layer. “the Toffoli-width of this algorithm is limited to one”
  • Trace of Frobenius: See Frobenius trace. “where tt is the trace of Frobenius”
  • Windowed quantum Fourier transform: A QFT divided into groups of bits or phases to reduce quantum resource requirements. “we use a windowed version of the semi-classical QFT with window size w=16w=16
  • Windowed scalar multiplication: Scalar multiplication decomposed into additions associated with blocks of scalar bits. “we implement a scalar multiplication [k]P[k]P by repeated point addition, decomposing the scalar kk into a windowed binary representation”
  • Windowed point addition: Elliptic-curve point addition performed as one stage of a windowed scalar-multiplication circuit. “resulting in a total of 28 windowed point additions”

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