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Understanding strategic bidding behavior in SAMP-SB

Characterize strategic bidding behavior for agents participating in the SAMP-SB simultaneous ascending (M+1)st-price auction protocol for supply chain formation in task dependency networks, including how agents should coordinate input and output bids over time, by developing a game-theoretic analysis or equilibrium characterization that specifies rational strategies in this dynamic mechanism.

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Background

Throughout the paper, agents are assumed to follow simple, non-strategic, myopic bidding policies in SAMP-SB due to the difficulty of analyzing strategic behavior in asynchronous iterative auctions with complementarities. The authors note that specifying the extensive-form game and computing equilibria for such markets is beyond current game-theoretic practice.

In the conclusions, they explicitly identify understanding strategic bidding behavior—especially coordinating input and output bids in the dynamic auction setting—as an unsolved problem and suggest it as important future work.

References

Because agents must coordinate input and output bids in a dynamic auction mechanism, understanding strategic bidding behavior is a challenging and unsolved, albeit important problem for future work.

— Decentralized Supply Chain Formation: A Market Protocol and Competitive Equilibrium Analysis (1107.0021 - Walsh et al., 2011) in Section 8 (Extensions and Future Work)