Incentive compatibility and Sybil resistance of Unbrowse incentives

Prove the incentive compatibility and Sybil-resistance properties of Unbrowse’s contributor incentive mechanisms, including the delta-based contribution attribution used for Tier 1 fee distribution.

Background

Unbrowse distributes Tier 1 fees among contributors using a delta-based attribution mechanism. The paper notes potential manipulation risks and that formal analysis is deferred, indicating a lack of rigorous guarantees about strategic behavior.

The authors explicitly list incentive compatibility proofs as an open problem in the conclusion.

References

Formal economic analysis, incentive compatibility proofs, controlled multi-region benchmarking, and deployment-scale validation remain open problems; the present contribution is an architectural proposal with an implemented system and initial empirical evidence that shared route lookup can outperform redundant browser rediscovery on the evaluated tasks.

Internal APIs Are All You Need: Shadow APIs, Shared Discovery, and the Case Against Browser-First Agent Architectures  (2604.00694 - Tham et al., 1 Apr 2026) in Conclusion (final paragraph)