Separating Legitimate Updates from Malicious Injections in Persistent Agent Files
Determine reliable criteria and mechanisms to separate legitimate updates from malicious injections in the persistent state files that enable evolution in OpenClaw (such as MEMORY.md, SOUL.md, IDENTITY.md, USER.md, and AGENTS.md), ensuring the agent can continue to learn and adapt without providing an attack surface for state poisoning.
References
A file-protection approach reduces injection rates by up to 97% but blocks legitimate agent updates at nearly the same rate, revealing a fundamental evolution--safety tradeoff: as long as the persistent files that enable evolution are also the attack surface, separating legitimate updates from injections remains an open problem.
Analysis localized the residual to transition churn at surface rotations, not to defection --- and exposed a timing dilemma that we state as the open core of machine immunity: lagging alarms (self-test decay) act after damage; leading alarms (contradiction rates) cannot distinguish coherent corruption from legitimate novelty.