Sealed-bid auctions via bidset: formal instantiation and analysis

Determine whether single-shot sealed-bid auction protocols cited in the paper (e.g., SEAL, FAST, Trustee, Secure Vickrey auctions, Riggs, and related single-shot designs) can be instantiated on top of the bidset protocol introduced in Section 5 by producing a formal analysis of such instantiations that establishes their properties when implemented over the pod-based bidset layer.

Background

The paper introduces pod-core, a generalized consensus primitive that achieves optimal single round-trip latency while providing past-perfection and accountability. Building on pod-core, the authors define and analyze bidset-core, a protocol that allows an auctioneer to collect bids with censorship resistance, weak consistency, and accountable safety.

Using bidset-core, the authors show how to construct single-shot open auctions (first-price and second-price) and argue that sealed-bid auctions share a structure that first agrees on a set of sealed bids before additional steps determine the winner. Based on this structural similarity, they conjecture that sealed-bid auction protocols can also be realized atop bidset, but they explicitly leave the formal analysis of such instantiations for future work.