Practical estimation of attack profitability for restaking services

Develop methods and tools to produce reliable practical estimates of the profit from corruption π_s for each service s in a restaking network, enabling practitioners to quantify attacker incentives and apply the paper’s overcollateralization and robustness analyses that assume these profit estimates are given.

Background

The paper models a restaking network with services S and validators V, where each service s ∈ S has an associated profit from corruption π_s. The central security and robustness results assume these π_s values are known, allowing the authors to characterize worst-case stake losses and provide overcollateralization conditions.

The authors explicitly note that having practical, defensible estimates of π_s is an open research need. Without such tools, it is challenging for protocol participants and analysts to assess whether the network meets the required buffer conditions and to compute the robustness measures derived in the paper.