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Extend bribery analysis to mixed rational–Byzantine models (e.g., BART)

Extend the bribery-attack analysis to settings where the adversary both bribes participants and directly controls stake, yielding a system with a mixture of rational and Byzantine players, and characterize equilibria under alternative frameworks such as BART.

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Background

The paper’s core model assumes all parties are rational and captures bribery as external rewards contingent on infractions and attack success. In practice, adversaries may combine bribery with direct control of system resources (e.g., by acquiring stake), producing heterogeneous participant types.

The authors explicitly point to hybrid models mixing rational and Byzantine behavior (e.g., BART) as an open direction to analyze bribery dynamics when the adversary can split budget between bribes and stake acquisition.

References

Our work also poses various open questions for future work. Third, we focus on mechanisms that can be naturally explored under the standard game- theoretic model. However, there could exist attack scenarios where the adversary externally incentivizes parties and controls others (e.g., by splitting its budget in bribes and acquiring stake). In this case, some parties can be considered rational while others are Byzantine, and it would be interesting to extend our results under alternative frameworks, such as BART [1].

— Blockchain Bribing Attacks and the Efficacy of Counterincentives (2402.06352 - Karakostas et al., 9 Feb 2024) in Section 8 (Conclusion)