Characterize properties and tradeoffs of good blockchain fee mechanisms

Characterize the desirable properties of a good blockchain transaction fee mechanism, identify the tradeoffs among such properties, and provide a precise definition of what constitutes a good fee mechanism in adversarial blockchain environments where traditional market-clearing prices may not exist.

Background

The paper studies multidimensional blockchain fee mechanisms via online convex optimization and proves near-optimal average regret guarantees for simple price update rules, even against worst-case adversaries. Early in the introduction, the authors note that, despite substantial work on specific mechanisms (e.g., EIP-1559 and multidimensional variants), the overall design space lacks a clear characterization.

They explicitly highlight uncertainty around defining and evaluating what makes a fee mechanism good, especially under adversarial conditions where classical market-clearing notions may fail. A precise characterization would guide mechanism design and benchmarking across blockchain systems.