Existence and design of an optimal-allocation oracle for multidimensional fee markets

Determine whether there exists a computational oracle that, given a vector of per-dimension unit base fees in a multidimensional blockchain fee market, can compute the optimal (surplus-maximizing) valid allocation of transactions; if such an oracle exists, construct it and characterize its computational and informational requirements, and if not, establish an impossibility result.

Background

The analysis of multidimensional fee markets in prior work often assumes an oracle that, given per-dimension prices, returns the optimal allocation. This oracle is used to obtain welfare guarantees for price update rules, but its feasibility and design are not specified.

In practical blockchain settings such as Ethereum, when multiple allocations clear the base fee, systems rely on priority fees to choose among them, which undermines incentive compatibility and strategic simplicity for users. Establishing whether such an oracle can be designed (and how) is thus pivotal for realizing multidimensional fee markets without sacrificing incentive properties.

Resolving this question would clarify whether price-only mechanisms can achieve efficiency in heterogeneous settings, or whether alternative designs (e.g., mechanisms like Resonance that delegate allocation discovery to brokers) are necessary.