Can cryptography and Bayesian equilibrium circumvent the TFM impossibility results?
Determine whether cryptographic enforcement of transaction fee mechanisms—such as in the multi-party computation (MPC)-assisted model—together with Bayesian notions of equilibrium can yield finite-block transaction fee mechanisms that overcome the paper’s impossibility results by simultaneously achieving appropriate incentive-compatibility and collusion-resilience properties (e.g., user incentive compatibility, miner incentive compatibility, and OCA-proofness or global side-contract-proofness).
References
It is an interesting open question whether using cryptography and Bayesian notions of equilibrium can help us overcome the impossibilities in this paper.
The Supplemental Appendix (Section~\ref{sa:general}) extends the impossibility to efficient, incentive-compatible payment rules whose outcomes are unchanged by lower-tail changes. Whether the privacy requirement alone yields such an impossibility when lower losing values can affect payments remains open, as do continuous type spaces and private randomization.