Stackelberg Game-Driven Defense for ISAC Against Channel Attacks in Low-Altitude Networks

Abstract: The increasing saturation of terrestrial resources has driven economic activities into low-altitude airspace. These activities, such as air taxis, rely on low-altitude wireless networks, and one key enabling technology is integrated sensing and communication (ISAC). However, in low-altitude airspace, ISAC is vulnerable to channel-access attacks, thereby degrading performance and threatening safety. To address this, we propose a defense framework based on a Stackelberg game. Specifically, we first model the system under attack, deriving metrics for the communication and the sensing to quantify performance. Then, we formulate the interaction as a three-player game where a malicious attacker acts as the leader, while the legitimate drone and ground base station act as followers. Using a backward induction algorithm, we obtain the Stackelberg equilibrium, allowing the defenders to dynamically adjust their strategies to mitigate the attack. Simulation results verify that the proposed algorithm converges to a stable solution and outperforms existing baselines, ensuring reliable ISAC performance for critical low-altitude applications.