Why Consciousness Should Explain Physical Phenomena: Toward a Testable Theory (2511.04047v1)

Abstract: The reductionist approach commonly employed in scientific methods presupposes that both macro and micro phenomena can be explained by micro-level laws alone. This assumption implies intra-level causal closure, rendering all macro phenomena epiphenomenal. However, the integrative nature of consciousness suggests that it is a macro phenomenon. To ensure scientific testability and reject epiphenomenalism, the reductionist assumption of intra-level causal closure must be rejected. This implies that even neural-level behavior cannot be explained by observable neural-level laws alone. Therefore, a new methodology is necessary to acknowledge the causal efficacy of macro-level phenomena. We model the brain as operating under dual laws at different levels. This model includes hypothetical macro-level psychological laws that are not determined solely by micro-level neural laws, as well as the causal effects from macro to micro levels. In this study, we propose a constructive approach that explains both mental and physical phenomena through the interaction between these two sets of laws.