Emergent Social Dynamics of LLM Agents in the El Farol Bar Problem (2509.04537v1)

Abstract: We investigate the emergent social dynamics of LLM agents in a spatially extended El Farol Bar problem, observing how they autonomously navigate this classic social dilemma. As a result, the LLM agents generated a spontaneous motivation to go to the bar and changed their decision making by becoming a collective. We also observed that the LLM agents did not solve the problem completely, but rather behaved more like humans. These findings reveal a complex interplay between external incentives (prompt-specified constraints such as the 60\% threshold) and internal incentives (culturally-encoded social preferences derived from pre-training), demonstrating that LLM agents naturally balance formal game-theoretic rationality with social motivations that characterize human behavior. These findings suggest that a new model of group decision making, which could not be handled in the previous game-theoretic problem setting, can be realized by LLM agents.