An Algorithm-to-Contract Framework without Demand Queries (2507.20038v1)

Abstract: Consider costly tasks that add up to the success of a project, and must be fitted by an agent into a given time-frame. This is an instance of the classic budgeted maximization problem, which admits an approximation scheme (FPTAS). Now assume the agent is performing these tasks on behalf of a principal, who is the one to reap the rewards if the project succeeds. The principal must design a contract to incentivize the agent. Is there still an approximation scheme? In this work, our ultimate goal is an algorithm-to-contract transformation, which transforms algorithms for combinatorial problems (like budgeted maximization) to tackle incentive constraints that arise in contract design. Our approach diverges from previous works on combinatorial contract design by avoiding an assumption of black-box access to a demand oracle. We first show how to "lift" the FPTAS for budgeted maximization to obtain the best-possible multiplicative and additive FPTAS for the contract design problem. We establish this through our "local-global" framework, in which the "local" step is to (approximately) solve a two-sided strengthened variant of the demand problem. The "global" step then utilizes the local one to find the approximately optimal contract. We apply our framework to a host of combinatorial constraints including multi-dimensional budgets, budgeted matroid, and budgeted matching constraints. In all cases we achieve an approximation essentially matching the best approximation for the purely algorithmic problem. We also develop a method to tackle multi-agent contract settings, where the team of working agents must abide to combinatorial feasibility constraints.