An evolutionary game theory approach to modeling behavioral interaction in disclosing infection begins with an outbreak: COVID-19 as an example (2410.17996v1)

Abstract: The global impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the livelihoods of people worldwide prompted the implementation of a range of preventive measures at local, national, and international levels. Early in the outbreak, before the vaccine became accessible, voluntary quarantine and social isolation emerged as crucial strategies to curb the spread of infection. In this research, we present a game-theoretic model to elucidate the voluntary disclosure of exposure to infected individuals within communities. By employing a fractional derivative approach to illustrate disease propagation within the compartmental model, we determine the minimum level of voluntary disclosure required to disrupt the chain of transmission and allow the epidemic to fade. Our findings suggest that higher transmission rates and increased perceived severity of infection change the externality of disclosing infected exposure, thereby contributing to a rise in the proportion of individuals opting for quarantine and reducing disease incidence. We estimate behavioral parameters and transmission rates by fitting the model to hospitalized cases in Chile, South America. Results from our paper underscore the potential for public health authorities to influence and regulate voluntary disclosure of infection during emerging outbreaks through effective risk communication, emphasizing the severity of the disease, and providing accurate information about hospital capacity to the public.