Interplay of Reward and Size of Groups in the Optional Public Goods Game

Abstract: The Optional Public Goods Game is a three-strategy game in which an individual can play as a cooperator or defector or decide not to participate. Despite its simplicity, this model can effectively represent many human social dilemmas, such as those found in the use of public services, environmental concerns, or other activities related to society. In this contribution, we present a comprehensive analysis of the conditions under which spontaneous, sustained cooperation emerges and the characteristics of these cooperative states. Through simulations, we demonstrate the conditions leading to the coexistence of the three strategies in a steady equilibrium or the alternate dominance of each strategy in a rock-paper-scissors fashion. The results identify each of the possible scenarios in terms of two key parameters: the multiplication rate of the public good game (reward) and the size of the group of potential players. We also discuss other details of the game that may influence the appearance of cycles, along with relevant characteristics of these cycles, such as the prevalence of cooperation.