On time-consistent equilibrium stopping under aggregation of diverse discount rates (2302.07470v2)

Abstract: This paper studies the central planner's decision making on behalf of a group of members with diverse discount rates. In the context of optimal stopping, we work with a smooth aggregation preference to incorporate all heterogeneous discount rates with an attitude function that reflects the aggregation rule in the same spirit of ambiguity aversion in the smooth ambiguity preference proposed in Klibanoff et al.(2005). The optimal stopping problem renders to be time inconsistent, for which we develop an iterative approach using consistent planning and characterize all time-consistent equilibria as fixed points of an operator in the setting of one-dimensional diffusion processes. We provide some sufficient conditions on both the underlying models and the attitude function such that the smallest equilibrium attains the optimal equilibrium in which the attitude function becomes equivalent to the linear aggregation rule as of diversity neutral. In addition, we show that the optimal equilibrium is a weak equilibrium in the existing literature. When the sufficient condition of the attitude function is violated, we can illustrate by various examples that the characterization of the optimal equilibrium may differ significantly from some existing results for an individual agent.