Analysis of Bitcoin Vulnerability to Bribery Attacks Launched Through Large Transactions (2105.07501v1)

Abstract: Bitcoin uses blockchain technology to maintain transactions order and provides probabilistic guarantee to prevent double-spending, assuming that an attacker's computational power does not exceed %50 of the network power. In this paper, we design a novel bribery attack and show that this guarantee can be hugely undermined. Miners are assumed to be rational in this setup and they are given incentives that are dynamically calculated. In this attack, the adversary misuses the Bitcoin protocol to bribe miners and maximize their gained advantage. We will reformulate the bribery attack to propose a general mathematical foundation upon which we build multiple strategies. We show that, unlike Whale Attack, these strategies are practical. If the rationality assumption holds, this shows how vulnerable blockchain-based systems like Bitcoin are. We suggest a soft fork on Bitcoin to fix this issue at the end.