Papers
Topics
Authors
Recent
Gemini 2.5 Flash
Gemini 2.5 Flash
149 tokens/sec
GPT-4o
9 tokens/sec
Gemini 2.5 Pro Pro
47 tokens/sec
o3 Pro
4 tokens/sec
GPT-4.1 Pro
38 tokens/sec
DeepSeek R1 via Azure Pro
28 tokens/sec
2000 character limit reached

Robustly Optimal Mechanisms for Selling Multiple Goods (2105.02828v4)

Published 6 May 2021 in econ.TH

Abstract: We study robustly optimal mechanisms for selling multiple items. The seller maximizes revenue against a worst-case distribution of a buyer's valuations within a set of distributions, called an "ambiguity" set. We identify the exact forms of robustly optimal selling mechanisms and the worst-case distributions when the ambiguity set satisfies various moment conditions on the values of subsets of goods. The analysis reveals general properties of the ambiguity set that justifies categorical bundling, which includes separate sales and pure bundling as special cases.

Summary

We haven't generated a summary for this paper yet.