Privacy and Robustness Guarantees in Distributed Dynamics for Aggregative Games

Abstract: This paper considers the problem of Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking in aggregative games, where the payoff function of each player depends on an aggregate of all players' actions. We present a distributed continuous time algorithm such that the actions of the players converge to NE by communicating to each other through a connected network. A major concern in communicative schemes among strategic agents is that their private information may be revealed to other agents or to a curious third party who can eavesdrop the communications. We address this concern for the presented algorithm and show that private information of the players cannot be reconstructed even if all the communicated variables are compromised. As agents may deviate from their optimal strategies dictated by the NE seeking protocol, we investigate robustness of the proposed algorithm against time-varying disturbances. In particular, we provide rigorous robustness guarantees by proving input to state stability (ISS) properties of the NE seeking dynamics. Finally, we demonstrate practical applications of our theoretical findings on two case studies; namely, on an energy consumption game and a charging coordination problem of electric vehicles.