Incentivizing decentralization in Web3 mechanisms
Develop mechanism design approaches for Web3 systems that explicitly incentivize decentralization among rational, strategic participants, ensuring that multiple independent providers are motivated to participate rather than allowing centralization by a single actor.
References
Designing mechanisms that incentivize decentralization in Web3 is still an open problem.
— V3rified: Revelation vs Non-Revelation Mechanisms for Decentralized Verifiable Computation
(2408.07177 - Gong et al., 2024) in Section 1: Introduction
Furthermore, they show that with a certain whistleblower mechanism independent node operators do not pool their execution efforts in equilibrium. However, the obtained execution diversity is not analyzed and remains an open question.
— One Node, Two Roles: Simultaneous Contests for Validation and Attention in Rollups
(2610.12220 - Anchuri et al., 8 Oct 2026) in Section 1, paragraph “Execution Diversity, the Sybil Problem and Isolating Attention from Validation”