Execution-trace privacy and low-overhead defences across quantum architectures

Formalise execution-trace privacy guarantees across quantum computing architectures, including fixed-connectivity superconducting hardware and potentially structurally immune reconfigurable or all-to-all platforms, and develop principled low-overhead defences against computational-intent leakage.

Background

The paper introduces Scientific-Intent Indistinguishability (SCI-IND) to capture leakage of hidden scientific workload structure through compilation and execution artefacts such as routing overhead, gate composition, circuit depth, and transpilation latency. Its analysis focuses on fixed-connectivity superconducting hardware, where routing-optimal compilation can expose non-isomorphic operator connectivity and where the evaluated gate-padding strategies fail to provide meaningful privacy without substantial fidelity loss.

The authors note that architectures with native reconfigurable or all-to-all connectivity, such as neutral-atom systems with shuttling, may avoid the structural leakage mechanism observed on constrained superconducting devices. The unresolved research agenda therefore includes both establishing formal execution-trace privacy guarantees across differing hardware domains and designing defences that reduce leakage at acceptable computational and fidelity costs.