Secure and Private Vickrey Auction Protocols: A Secure Multiparty Computation Approach (2304.14626v1)

Abstract: Recent attention on secure multiparty computation and blockchain technology has garnered new interest in developing auction protocols in a decentralized setting. In this paper, we propose a secure and private Vickrey auction protocol that addresses the challenge of maintaining auction correctness while preserving the confidentiality of bidders' information. Our protocol leverages secure multiparty computation (SMPC) techniques that enable decentralized computation of the final payment price without disclosing additional information. The total computational complexity of our proposed protocol, including preparation, is $O(n^2 k)$, and the complexity for the main auction is $O(n k)$. Furthermore, we show that our protocol is resistant to collusion and the auction outcome is publicly verifiable, which prevents dishonest bidders from altering this outcome.