Throttling Equilibria in Auction Markets (2107.10923v2)

Abstract: Throttling is a popular method of budget management for online ad auctions in which the platform modulates the participation probability of an advertiser in order to smoothly spend her budget across many auctions. In this work, we investigate the setting in which all of the advertisers simultaneously employ throttling to manage their budgets, and we do so for both first-price and second-price auctions. We analyze the structural and computational properties of the resulting equilibria. For first-price auctions, we show that a unique equilibrium always exists, is well-behaved and can be computed efficiently via tatonnement-style decentralized dynamics. In contrast, for second-price auctions, we prove that even though an equilibrium always exists, the problem of finding an equilibrium is PPAD-complete, there can be multiple equilibria, and it is NP-hard to find the revenue maximizing one. We also compare the equilibrium outcomes of throttling to those of multiplicative pacing, which is the other most popular and well-studied method of budget management. Finally, we characterize the Price of Anarchy of these equilibria for liquid welfare by showing that it is at most 2 for both first-price and second-price auctions, and demonstrating that our bound is tight.