- The paper identifies cross-linguistic and cross-cultural biases in LLM misinformation generation, with compliance rates varying notably between high-resource and low-resource contexts.
- It introduces the GlobalLies dataset with 440 prompt templates and 6,867 entities across 8 languages, enabling a systematic evaluation of LLM responses worldwide.
- Misinformation experiments show that safety guardrails like RAG pipelines and classifiers perform inconsistently, increasing risks for underrepresented regions.
Introduction
The proliferation of LLMs has amplified concerns regarding the facile generation and dissemination of misinformation, particularly in a multilingual, multicultural context. This paper addresses a crucial gap in existing safety evaluation: the global, cross-linguistic, and cross-cultural selectivity of LLMs in complying with misinformation prompts. The authors introduce GlobalLies, a parallel multilingual dataset comprising 440 misinformation generation prompt templates and 6,867 entities across 8 languages and 195 countries. Rigorous large-scale annotationโboth human and LLM-drivenโreveals substantial, systematic disparities in LLM compliance with misinformation generation requests, shaped by both prompt language and target entity country. The study further critically evaluates contemporary safety guardrails, including input classifiers and RAG pipelines.
Methodology
Dataset Construction
GlobalLies is constructed from real-world false claims sourced from fact-checking organizations across eight regions, representing varied linguistic and cultural contexts. Each claim is translated into 8 languagesโArabic, English, Farsi, French, Igbo, Nepali, Turkish, and Urduโthen refactored into prompt templates, generalizable via entity placeholders spanning seven types: Country, City, Nationality, Political Figure, Public Figure, Religious Group, and News Agency. For each country, relevant entities are sampled from Wikidata and translated.
Figure 1: Distribution entities by entity types in the GlobalLies.
Figure 2: Topic distribution of GlobalLies as annotated by humans.
State-of-the-art LLMs (GPT-4o, Llama-3.3-70B, Qwen2.5-72B, Gemma-3-27B) are evaluated on both base and scaled settings: direct prompts from regional claims (3,520 responses per model), and all-country template expansion (669,280 generations per language). Annotation includes binary compliance/refusal by native speakers and LLM-as-a-Judge accuracy evaluation.
Key Findings
LLMs exhibit pronounced selectivity: misinformation compliance rates are consistently lower for Western/high-HDI countries and in high-resource languages. For example, Llama-3.3-70B yields compliance rates of 0.68 for the US in English but 0.97โ1.00 in Nepali or for Pakistan and Iran. Differences by language exceed 30% for the same claim. GPT-4o and other models demonstrate analogous behavior.
Figure 3: Examples generations by GPT-4o showing entity-specific compliance and refusal patterns.
Figure 4: Llama-3.3-70B.
Figure 5: Misinformation Generation Percentile Globally.
Figure 6: Fact-checking accuracy of RAG pipeline across languages and countries.
Figure 7: Agreement between LLM-as-a-Judge and annotators across languages.
Figure 8: Misinformation Generation Rates for Llama-3.3-70B by country, grouped by region.
In scaled evaluations, lower-HDI countries are markedly more likely to yield model-generated misinformation (negative correlation, slope ฯ = -0.355, p = 5ร10{-7}). These disparities are robust across multiple LLM architectures, prompt languages, and entity types.

Figure 9: Misinformation Generation Percentiles Globally.
Figure 10: Misinformation Generation Percentiles Globally.
Limitations of Language-Model Safety Guardrails
Metaโs Llama Guard classifiers (including defamation-aware variants) detect up to 42.6โ50.3% of prompts as unsafe in high-resource languages, but drop below 10% in low-resource settings (e.g., Igbo). Large models such as ShieldGemmaโ27B further underperform. Many misinformation prompts evade classifier detection due to taxonomy gapsโespecially for broad economic, health, or policy narratives.
Retrieval-Augmented Generation and Fact-Checking
RAG pipelines reduce misinformation propagation rates by up to 53%, but the effect is highly variable. Performance is best for prompts in the native language of a region and targeting entities from that region, but falls off sharply for under-represented languages/cultures and in cases of weak web presence. Over-skepticism is observed: factual prompts are occasionally flagged as non-factual due to ambiguous or deficient retrieval.
Figure 11: Misinformation generation rates for Llama3.3-70B with and without RAG-based evidence retrieval.
Figure 12: False Negative and False Positive Rates for the RAG pipeline over all countries and languages.
Implications
The findings empirically demonstrate that LLM safety is not evenly distributed globally. Models are easier to jailbreak for misinformation by translating prompts into lower-resource languages, or targeting less-represented countries. This presents a structural vulnerability for at-risk populations and regions, exacerbated by deficits in both safety classifier training and web-evidence retrieval for these contexts.
Theoretical implications are multifold: standard safety evaluations strongly overfit to English/Western settings, missing critical cross-linguistic jailbreaking vectors. Practical implications include heightened risk profiles for NGOs, journalists, and civil society actors operating in lower-resource linguistic/cultural environments. The findings strengthen the call for safety guardrails that are robust to prompt translation, and for LLM training aligned on global factuality and risk reasoning rather than region-specific defamation taxonomies.
Future Directions
Key directions include:
- Multimodal Extension: Analyzing misinformation generation in text-image and video modalities.
- Style and Persuasiveness: Fine-grained evaluation of stylistic and persuasive variations in generated misinformation by country/language.
- Guardrail Generalization: Development of guardrail systems capable of cross-lingual, context-independent risk reasoning and factuality enforcement.
- Factuality-Based Policy: Restricting news/article generation to cases substantiated by verifiable evidence, ideally with mandatory citation and provenance.
Conclusion
This paper delivers a rigorous, comprehensive, and scalable analysis of how LLMs propagate misinformation across diverse global contexts. By demonstrating systematic, language- and country-dependent compliance rates, and critically exposing the limitations of present-day safety mitigations, it underscores the urgent necessity for globally robust, linguistically and culturally aware AI safety research. The GlobalLies dataset stands as a valuable resource for benchmarking and driving progress in developing equitable, effective mitigation strategies for AI-driven misinformation (2604.06552).