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A proposal for the safety and controllability requirements that SRM systems should meet

Published 2 Apr 2026 in physics.ao-ph, physics.geo-ph, and physics.soc-ph | (2604.02283v1)

Abstract: Solar Radiation Modification (SRM) may be the only way to limit global warming in the coming decades, leading to increased interest in the subject and to the expansion of related research & development (R&D) activity. Defining the safety and controllability requirements that any SRM system should meet is crucial for directing R&D activities and enabling governments to make informed decisions on the development and possible implementation of such systems. We present an initial proposal for this set of requirements, which also guides Stardust's R&D, as a basis for further discussion and consideration. While we focus on SRM systems based on Stratospheric Aerosol Injection (SAI), the proposed principles may be applicable more broadly.

Summary

  • The paper establishes quantifiable safety criteria for SRM particle design by evaluating toxicity, environmental fate, and regulatory limits.
  • It proposes stringent atmospheric controls by capping ozone depletion and cloud radiative forcing impacts through defined thresholds.
  • The research recommends adaptive deployment and shutdown strategies to ensure precise radiative forcing control and mitigate climatic uncertainties.

Safety and Controllability Requirements for Solar Radiation Modification (SRM) Systems

Introduction and Justification for SRM System Requirements

The authors propose a detailed, safety-driven framework for evaluating Solar Radiation Modification (SRM) system design and implementation, focusing primarily on Stratospheric Aerosol Injection (SAI). With global mean surface temperatures surpassing 1°C above pre-industrial baselines and emission scenarios predicting substantial further warming and sea level rise, the urgency for contingency interventions is underscored. Contemporary mitigation strategies, including rapid decarbonization and scalable engineered carbon dioxide removal (CDR), are unlikely to suffice in the near term. SRM, specifically SAI, is proposed as a means to offset radiative forcing (RF) attributable to accumulated greenhouse gases, potentially “buying time” as deep emission reductions progress.

Given the proliferation of SRM research and the potential for imminent large-scale experimentation or deployment, the absence of codified safety and controllability requirements presents unaddressed governance and risk concerns. This proposal is positioned as both a reference for ongoing R&D efforts and a foundation for international regulatory discussion.

Risk Taxonomy and Guiding Principles

The framework distinguishes three interdependent risk categories:

  • Direct human, biotic, and environmental harms: Risks from the particles themselves, including toxicological exposure and environmental fate of materials.
  • Atmospheric chemistry and composition risks: Effects on stratospheric and tropospheric chemical cycles, notably ozone depletion via heterogeneous chemistry and alteration of cloud nucleation processes.
  • Climatic system impacts: Uncertainties in the spatial and temporal climate response to RF modifications, confounded by model and measurement limitations.

For the first two categories, regulatory precedents and established methodologies are emphasized; their application is grounded in extant guidelines (e.g., OECD, EU REACH, U.S. EPA, and relevant international conventions). However, climatic risk assessment is fundamentally constrained by limitations in both model predictivity and empirical detectability of SAI-induced signals, especially for regional and temporal variability.

A central thesis of the paper is the decoupling of optimality from safety: system parameters (e.g., particle material, morphology, dispersal strategy) should be derived from risk minimization, not cost or technological expediency. This motivates the exploration of alternatives to sulfate aerosols, such as solid particles with lower ozone impact and more tunable radiative properties.

Quantitative Safety and Controllability Requirements

Human, Biota, and Environmental Safety

Safety criteria for particle materials, distribution, and environmental fate are operationalized through multiple mechanisms:

  • All SAI particles must meet established toxicity, carcinogenicity, and environmental compatibility standards, with exposure limits informed by regulatory NOAECs (No Observed Adverse Effect Concentrations) and safety margins typically ranging from 100 to 1000.
  • Particle design must avoid “nanoform” materials likely to possess heightened toxicological unknowns.
  • Comprehensive fate and accumulation studies are required to ensure particle or byproduct accumulation cannot drive chronic or acute risk, leveraging existing methodologies for bioaccumulation, persistence, and eco-toxicological testing.

Atmospheric Chemistry and Composition Safety

Requirements are defined to be conservative and quantifiable:

  • Direct chemical interactions with stratospheric constituents must be limited to producing changes less than 0.01 Dobson Units (DU) or 1% in halogen-catalyst trace gases.
  • Ozone column depletion attributable to SAI must not exceed 1 DU on a global scale, with regional springtime maxima capped at 3 DU, staying well below historic volcanic and anthropogenic depletion events and below the resolution of current trend measurement techniques.
  • Heterogeneous chemical impacts, surface area modification of background aerosol (e.g., catalytic cycles involving sulfates), and cloud nucleation effects are tightly constrained, e.g., any change in global mean cirrus cloud radiative forcing (RF) from injected particles must not exceed 10% of the instantaneous RF.
  • All requirements extend through the full aging cycle of particles, demanding experimental verification of reactivity stability and byproduct safety.

Climatic Impacts and System Controllability

Performance requirements are defined in terms of the system’s ability to deliver and adapt spatially and temporally resolved radiative forcing, and are directly linked to verifiable observables:

  • Gradual Deployment: The system must support a “ramp-up” pilot phase (<0.1% global RF perturbation), with real-time monitoring enabling accurate validation (10% relative accuracy) of dispersed particle fields, size distributions, and resulting IRF/SARF.
  • Shutdown Flexibility: Both rapid (natural decay with 1-year e-folding) and gradual (years to decades) termination capabilities are required, limiting risks of termination shock or system lock-in.
  • Radiative Forcing Control: The IRF/SARF must be controllable to within 0.2 W/m² for hemispheric averages; spatial flexibility must allow latitude-resolved control down to 20° bins, commensurate with the natural limits imposed by atmospheric transport.
  • Predictability: For local (1000 km, 1 month average) scales, the RF effect must be predictable to better than 10%, matching current uncertainty in GHG forcing estimations.
  • Stratospheric Heating: Modifications to lower stratospheric temperature over the tropics (50–100 hPa, 25°N–25°S) must be kept below 1.5 K, with downstream constraints on stratospheric water vapor and Hadley circulation.
  • Monitoring and Validation: The system must incorporate high-frequency, high-precision monitoring for particles, RF, and temperature, and enable origin tagging of particles to support verification, governance, and adaptive management.

Implications and Future Directions

The authors’ synthesis delineates ambitious, yet verifiable, target parameters across the SAI system lifecycle. The outlined requirements, if met, would provide a basis for defensible international governance, the creation of robust regulatory frameworks, and enable the comparison of SAI’s residual risks with those of unabated warming.

The emphasis on system controllability—mandating high spatial, temporal, and process-level resolution in monitoring and feedback—establishes a strong precedent for adaptive management of SRM interventions. This has direct implications for future AI integration, where closed-loop control architectures, anomaly detection, and real-time optimization will become essential. Rigorous adherence to stringent, standardized risk criteria for particle materials will constrain the design space but may also drive innovation in manufacturing science, traceability, and robust environmental sensing.

The framework explicitly identifies current research gaps, such as refined understanding of atmospheric feedbacks, improved detection capabilities for climate signals, and the need for more definitive endpoints for adverse impact prioritization within climate response modeling. Further advances in these domains will likely derive from advances in coupled Earth System Modeling, sensor technology, autonomous control systems, and international legal standards.

Conclusion

This proposal articulates a comprehensive, quantifiable safety and controllability envelope for SAI-based SRM systems, founded upon established toxicological, chemical, and environmental risk frameworks, and extended through novel requirements for radiative forcing control and system adaptivity. The framework’s adoption would considerably enhance the rigor and transparency of SRM R&D and potential deployment, supporting both effective climate risk management and the construction of international regulatory consensus. The proposals elucidate a clear research agenda toward narrowing uncertainties and ensuring policy-relevant safety assurances for SRM interventions.

Reference: "A proposal for the safety and controllability requirements that SRM systems should meet" (2604.02283)

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