Early Approaches to Adversarial Fine-Tuning for Prompt Injection Defense: A 2022 Study of GPT-3 and Contemporary Models (2509.14271v1)

Abstract: This paper documents early research conducted in 2022 on defending against prompt injection attacks in LLMs, providing historical context for the evolution of this critical security domain. This research focuses on two adversarial attacks against LLMs: prompt injection and goal hijacking. We examine how to construct these attacks, test them on various LLMs, and compare their effectiveness. We propose and evaluate a novel defense technique called Adversarial Fine-Tuning. Our results show that, without this defense, the attacks succeeded 31\% of the time on GPT-3 series models. When using our Adversarial Fine-Tuning approach, attack success rates were reduced to near zero for smaller GPT-3 variants (Ada, Babbage, Curie), though we note that subsequent research has revealed limitations of fine-tuning-based defenses. We also find that more flexible models exhibit greater vulnerability to these attacks. Consequently, large models such as GPT-3 Davinci are more vulnerable than smaller models like GPT-2. While the specific models tested are now superseded, the core methodology and empirical findings contributed to the foundation of modern prompt injection defense research, including instruction hierarchy systems and constitutional AI approaches.