Test convergence under alternative supply and demand schedules

Investigate whether LLM-agent continuous double auctions converge toward competitive equilibrium when evaluated under different supply and demand schedules.

Background

The study uses a deliberately symmetric market design with fixed buyer reservation prices and seller reservation prices, yielding a competitive equilibrium price of $2.00 and quantity of six trades. Although this design isolates behavioral differences between buyers and sellers, it does not establish whether the findings generalize to other market structures.

The authors explicitly leave testing convergence under different supply and demand schedules for future research, making generalization across market conditions an unresolved question.

References

Our framework supports evaluating additional models across a range of market conditions, and testing convergence under different supply and demand schedule would be an interesting question, which we leave for future research.

— Competitive Market Behavior of LLMs  (2609.02580 - Struski et al., 2 Sep 2026) in Section 6, Conclusions and Future Work