Rigorous PDE formulation of equilibrium payoffs in asymmetric-information Dynkin games
Develop a rigorous theorem that formalizes the PDE-based characterization of the equilibrium payoff processes in the asymmetric-information Dynkin games described in Section 6.3, including (i) the partially observed dynamics model in which a diffusion X has a drift determined by an unobserved regime J∈{0,1} and the uninformed player’s posterior ψ evolves under the innovation process, and (ii) the partially observed scenarios model with a finite regime affecting payoffs. Precisely establish the variational inequality system for the informed players’ value functions u^0 and u^1 and the uninformed player’s value function v, identify the associated stopping regions, and prove equivalence of this PDE system to the martingale and saddle-point conditions defining equilibria in randomised stopping times.
References
Although it is unclear how to formulate a rigorous statement, we want to discuss here some natural ideas that hopefully can provide useful tools for practical solution of specific problems.