Screen-reader accessibility versus A3 resistance

Resolve the conflict between screen-reader accessibility and resistance to class A3 extraction attacks in the Multi-Layer Context Camouflaging Theory.

Background

Screen readers may process the full laminated field, including camouflage tokens, unless those positions are explicitly marked for exclusion. However, marking camouflage positions in an accessible representation can expose the separation information to a class A3 adversary, defined as a scripted reader of the document object model or related styling metadata.

The paper identifies this as a fundamental practical conflict between making the system accessible and preventing machine extraction. It does not provide a clean mechanism that preserves screen-reader usability while withholding the class-A3-relevant signal.

References

The open problems we would most like to see addressed are the exchange rate between obfuscation and plausibility in Theorem 6, a construction for the inversion operator satisfying conditions C1 to C3 at useful density, and the conflict between screen-reader accessibility and resistance to class A3.

— Multi-Layer Context Camouflaging: A Semantic Superposition and Contextual Lamination Framework for Malpractice-Resilient Online Assessment  (2608.13100 - Raj et al., 13 Aug 2026) in Section XVI, Conclusion; see also Section XV, Limitations