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Security of L2FE-Hash for non-uniform input distributions

Prove that the L2FE-Hash fuzzy extractor remains computationally secure when the input embedding distribution X is non-uniform but well-behaved, in the sense that each disjoint ε-ball (representing a user identity) in the support C_ε has bounded probability mass; specifically, show that the L2FE-Hash output conditioned on the helper string retains sufficient min-entropy and is computationally indistinguishable from random under these non-uniform conditions.

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Background

The paper proves L2FE-Hash security as a fuzzy extractor under the assumption that the input distribution X is uniform over a union of disjoint ε-balls (C_ε). This yields computational indistinguishability of outputs from uniform, thereby satisfying fuzzy extractor security and the ideal primitive’s security property.

Real-world face embedding distributions are typically non-uniform. The authors identify a broader, practical class—non-uniform but well-behaved distributions with bounded mass per ε-ball—and conjecture that L2FE-Hash remains secure under such distributions by maintaining sufficient min-entropy in its outputs conditioned on helper data.

A proof would extend the theoretical guarantee of L2FE-Hash to more realistic distributions encountered in practice and solidify its applicability beyond the uniform-support assumption.

References

If $X$ is a non-uniform but well-behaved distribution with a bounded probability mass in each disjoint $\epsilon$-ball (user identity) of $C_\epsilon$, we conjecture that L2FE-Hash output will be a non-uniform distribution but still with sufficient min-entropy. So, no poly-time adversary would be able to distinguish L2FE-Hash outputs from random given polynomially many samples, and the analogous security claim follows.

Model Inversion Attacks Meet Cryptographic Fuzzy Extractors (2510.25687 - Prabhakar et al., 29 Oct 2025) in Remark 2, Section 7 (Our Proposed Scheme: L2FE-Hash)