Security of L2FE-Hash for non-uniform input distributions
Prove that the L2FE-Hash fuzzy extractor remains computationally secure when the input embedding distribution X is non-uniform but well-behaved, in the sense that each disjoint ε-ball (representing a user identity) in the support C_ε has bounded probability mass; specifically, show that the L2FE-Hash output conditioned on the helper string retains sufficient min-entropy and is computationally indistinguishable from random under these non-uniform conditions.
References
If $X$ is a non-uniform but well-behaved distribution with a bounded probability mass in each disjoint $\epsilon$-ball (user identity) of $C_\epsilon$, we conjecture that L2FE-Hash output will be a non-uniform distribution but still with sufficient min-entropy. So, no poly-time adversary would be able to distinguish L2FE-Hash outputs from random given polynomially many samples, and the analogous security claim follows.