Firm-level title prevalence and equilibrium inflation

Determine how equilibrium behavior changes when the additional utility from receiving the managerial job title depends on the number of employees within a firm who hold that title, including whether firms then limit the extent of job title inflation.

Background

The paper identifies firm-level status effects as a potentially important extension of its job-title-inflation model. If the value of the managerial title falls as more employees within the same firm receive it, a firm may no longer benefit from assigning the title broadly. The authors explicitly conjecture that this modification could significantly change equilibrium behavior, but leave the analysis unresolved.

References

In contrast, our conjecture is that allowing the extra utility to depend on the number of individuals within a firm with the managerial title may have significant effects on equilibrium behavior because it can give firms an incentive to limit the degree of job title inflation within the firm.

— Promotion Signaling and Signal Jamming: An Analysis of Job Title Inflation  (2610.26494 - Chen et al., 19 Oct 2026) in Section 5, Conclusion