Efficient pseudorandom unitaries with general (adaptive) query security
Establish the existence of efficient pseudorandom unitary ensembles that are computationally indistinguishable from Haar measure against any polynomial-time quantum adversary making general (adaptive) oracle queries, under standard cryptographic assumptions such as the existence of quantum-secure one-way functions.
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However, the existence of efficient pseudorandom unitaries with general query security remains open.
Finally, the optimal depth of strong pseudorandom unitaries remains open. The present theorem gives a logarithmic-depth information-theoretic strong-design construction, but it does not provide a keyed family or computational security against efficient distinguishers. A logarithmic-depth, system-only construction of strong pseudorandom unitaries would require a suitable keyed local primitive together with a security-composition theorem that remains valid under inverse, transpose, and complex-conjugate queries.
A natural next step is to extend the theory of distinctness to stronger query models, including inverse, transpose, conjugate, controlled, and adaptive access. Is there a hierarchy of distinctness conditions corresponding to these increasingly powerful notions of security? Can such conditions again be separated from unitary-design properties and used both to construct and to rule out PRUs and $t$-designs secure against the corresponding query models?
Another similar question is whether the real- and complex-valued PRUs and $t$-designs proposed here remain secure against stronger forms of query accesses.
These questions remain largely open. We do not know how deep these circuits need to be to generate pseudorandom quantum states, how ancillary workspace affects the depth, or whether local Haar randomness suffices or structured cryptographic ensembles are required.