Adverse selection from raising submission costs under journal competition

Determine whether, in a competitive multi-journal environment where journals both screen submissions and compete for authors, increasing the submission cost c at a single journal leads to adverse selection such that higher-type authors (with stronger private signals of manuscript quality) avoid the costlier journal while lower-type authors are attracted to it. Establish this effect within a formal model of competing journals that share a reviewer pool and where acceptance probabilities adjust with thinner competition for publication slots at the costlier journal.

Background

The paper argues that competition among journals compels them to both screen authors and attract submissions, creating complex incentives when a journal adjusts its submission costs. Raising c could improve acceptance odds via thinner competition, but may deter strong authors while enticing weaker ones, potentially undermining screening.

The authors explicitly conjecture the direction of this selection effect and note that a proper formal treatment of competition and screening lies beyond the paper’s scope. Resolving this conjecture would clarify the consequences of submission fees or other cost-increasing policies on the composition of submissions and the quality of published work.