Accuracy versus recognitional justice in generative AI
Determine when generative AI systems should accurately represent existing social reality and when they should instead produce deliberately idealized representations to challenge status subordination, including how to distinguish justified departures from reality from counterproductive distortions and assess their trade-offs against values such as reliability and trust.
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This observation raises deeper normative questions that accuracy-oriented remedies can't answer: Should generative AI accurately represent social reality when that reality is structured by injustice, or should it deliberately produce a more idealized but descriptively inaccurate representation? When does departing from existing social reality constitute a justified challenge to status subordination, and at what point does it become an idealized and counter-productive distortion? These questions illustrate that whether a representation is accurate is not by itself the right normative question. What matters is whether, in any particular case, reflecting or departing from real existing conditions contributes to parity of participation. And of course, that's not the only relevant question---the case for inaccurate but recognitionally reparative generative AI outputs would have to contend with possible trade-offs against other socially important values, such as reliability and trust.