Secure One-Sided Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution Under Collective Attacks with Enhanced Robustness (2507.18744v1)

Abstract: We study the security of a quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol under the one-sided device-independent (1sDI) setting, which assumes trust in only one party's measurement device. This approach effectively provides a balance between the experimental viability of device-dependent (DD-QKD) and the minimal trust assumptions of device-independent (DI-QKD). An analytical lower bound on the asymptotic key rate is derived to provide security against collective attacks, in which the eavesdropper's information is limited only by the function of observed violation of a linear quantum steering inequality, specifically the three-setting Cavalcanti--Jones--Wiseman--Reid (CJWR) inequality. We provide a closed-form key rate formula by reducing the security analysis to mixtures of Bell-diagonal states by utilizing symmetries of the steering functional. We show that the protocol tolerates higher quantum bit error rates (QBER) than present DI-QKD protocols by benchmarking its performance under depolarizing noise. Furthermore, we explore the impact of detection inefficiencies and show that, in contrast to DI-QKD, which requires near-perfect detection, secure key generation can be achieved even with lower detection efficiency on the untrusted side. These findings demonstrate the viability of using 1sDI-QKD with current technology and highlight its advantages as a steering-based substitute for secure quantum communication.