Apate - A Linux Kernel Module for High Interaction Honeypots

Abstract: Honeypots are used in IT Security to detect and gather information about ongoing intrusions, e.g., by documenting the approach of an attacker. Honeypots do so by presenting an interactive system that seems just like a valid application to an attacker. One of the main design goals of honeypots is to stay unnoticed by attackers as long as possible. The longer the intruder interacts with the honeypot, the more valuable information about the attack can be collected. Of course, another main goal of honeypots is to not open new vulnerabilities that attackers can exploit. Thus, it is necessary to harden the honeypot and the surrounding environment. This paper presents Apate, a Linux Kernel Module (LKM) that is able to log, block and manipulate system calls based on preconfigurable conditions like Process ID (PID), User Id (UID), and many more. Apate can be used to build and harden High Interaction Honeypots. Apate can be configured using an integrated high level language. Thus, Apate is an important and easy to use building block for upcoming High Interaction Honeypots.

• The paper presents Apate, a Linux kernel module that covertly intercepts and manipulates system calls to bolster honeypot security.
• It employs a rules-based configuration language to enable dynamic and complex responses based on syscall conditions.
• Evaluation shows Apate maintains low latency overhead while ensuring stealth and robust performance during intrusion simulations.

High Interaction Honeypot Enhancements through Apate

Introduction

The paper "Apate - A Linux Kernel Module for High Interaction Honeypots" (1507.03117) introduces a Linux Kernel Module designed to strengthen High Interaction Honeypots. Apate is engineered to invisibly intercept, log, and manipulate system calls in response to pre-configured conditions such as process ID and user ID. Honeypots, particularly those with high interaction, simulate real systems to engage attackers and gather actionable intelligence regarding intrusion strategies while ensuring minimal additional vulnerabilities are introduced. Apate achieves this through a refined configuration language allowing easy customizations to deceive attackers and protect honeypot integrity.

Design and Implementation

Apate leverages system call interception without modifying the syscall table, reducing the risk of detection. It employs a hooking strategy that allows system call behavior to be logged, manipulated, or blocked based on rules defined via a high-level configuration language. This language supports complex scenarios through constructs resembling functional programming and packet filter configurations, enabling dynamic response based on syscall or user context.

Configuration System

The configuration is grounded in defining conditions and actions, with the system using a rules-based engine to determine the response upon syscall interception. It supports fine-grained control over system interactions — allowing for the presentation of modified environments to attackers based on pre-determined parameters. This ability aids in creating realistic deception scenarios, essential for gathering intelligence without compromising the integrity or resources of the honeypot.

Manipulating System Calls

Apate’s manipulation strategy involves an action dispatcher executing defined routines upon hook activation. Actions can alter syscall parameters, perform logging, or completely block execution, each represented by a predefined action chain. This control mechanism ensures the honeypot system remains secure and functional while mimicking potential vulnerabilities enticing enough for attackers to expose their techniques.

Evaluation and Performance

Apate’s evaluation focuses on three primary goals: configurability, stealth, and performance. The configuration mechanism is demonstrated to be Turing complete, allowing a comprehensive array of potential rule combinations. In terms of stealth, Apate effectively obfuscates its presence by removing traces from common system directories and obstructing standard detection utilities. Tests reveal Apate operates with minimal performance overhead. The module uses various settings to benchmark syscall overhead, demonstrating low latency impact in comparison with non-intercepted calls, even during intensive logging and condition evaluations.

Implications and Future Work

By providing a robust, configurable framework, Apate advances the utility of high interaction honeypots. These systems not only serve the immediate purpose of deception and intelligence gathering but also provide foundational insights that can enhance broader network security postures. As attackers evolve, future developments might focus on enhancing the adaptability of honeypot responses and bolstering defenses against forensic techniques targeting kernel modifications. Additionally, the straightforward configuration via a high-level language underscores potential for Apate to serve as a modular component in broader security tools.

Conclusion

Apate epitomizes a step forward in High Interaction Honeypot design, seamlessly integrating with Linux systems to offer comprehensive syscall control. Its design adeptly balances between functionality and security, delivering an effective tool for intrusion detection and attacker behavior analysis. With capabilities to manipulate, log and disguise syscall activity, Apate constitutes an essential addition to the arsenal available for cyber defense.