The Self-Improvement Problem

Abstract: With the rise of LLMs, agentic systems are becoming increasingly autonomous, as they write code, call tools, revise prompts, and propose modifications to their own components. This autonomy raises a fundamental question for safe self-improvement: can an automated gate like a reward model or an automated reviewer reliably decide whether a proposed update should be accepted? The difficulty is structural. The gate must be a terminating, computable procedure, while the property we ultimately care about, namely whether an update is a genuine semantic improvement, depends on potentially unbounded program behavior. We formalize this mismatch by modeling agents as programs and defining improvement in terms of a semantic score that need not be computable. We study two evaluation abstractions. The first is a certifier that approves or rejects an update. The second is a search procedure that, given access to a proposal generator, attempts to output some improving candidate if one exists. We show that, in the fully general setting, no terminating procedure can simultaneously guarantee reliability (never accepting a non-improvement) and non-conservatism (never missing an available improvement): self-referential constructions can force any such gate or searcher to fail. Randomized gates with bounded error face the same limit. We then identify a standard decidable regime used in practice (bounded evaluation and a finite proposal budget) under which exhaustive simulation yields a terminating search procedure with the desired guarantees. We also show the limit of this recovery: a chain of accepted updates can raise the bounded score in every round while the true score falls. Our results draw a boundary between unbounded, universal settings where correctness guarantees collapse and bounded settings where they can be recovered by design.