Towards Safe World Models: Risks, Defenses, and Evaluation

Abstract: World models support planning, control, learning from imagined experience, and model-mediated evaluation by predicting action-conditioned consequences. Their safety cannot be inferred from predictive accuracy alone: errors in observations, state and memory, dynamics, evaluation, execution, or feedback can propagate into unsafe decisions and persist through updates. This work organizes the literature on world-model safety around a six-stage lifecycle covering data and observations, state and memory, dynamics and imagination, evaluation and planning, action and control, and feedback and update. We synthesize non-adversarial failures, attacks, defenses, evaluation protocols, benchmarks, and deployment conditions, and distinguish evidence directness from outcome level. The current evidence corpus contains 163 cited works. We use the framework to identify where claims are supported, where attribution remains unresolved, and which measurements are needed to connect model-level behavior to closed-loop and operational safety.