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Autonomous OSS Threat Detection via Taxonomy-Aligned LLMs

Published 1 Oct 2026 in cs.CR | (2610.01263v1)

Abstract: Open source software (OSS) ecosystems face growing threats from sophisticated supply chain attacks including typosquatting, dependency confusion, Trojan Source obfuscation, malicious build injection, and CI/CD pipeline poisoning. Existing detection approaches rely on signature-based tools and rule-based systems that struggle to generalize across attack variants and emerging threat patterns. In this paper we propose a taxonomy-aligned LLM framework for automated detection and classification of OSS supply chain threats. We introduce a structured AV-xxx threat taxonomy covering five attack categories and construct a curated dataset of 999 verified real-world OSS supply chain incidents sourced from GitHub Security Advisories, CISA alerts, and security research reports spanning 2018 to 2026. Using taxonomy-aligned prompt engineering with GPT-4, our framework achieves 97.0\% multi-class classification accuracy and 97.0\% macro F1 score across all five threat categories. Comparative evaluation against five traditional machine learning baselines, one zero-shot open source LLM, and two fine-tuned neural models reveals a surprising finding: fine-tuned Llama 3.1 8B (70.5%) and SecRoBERTa (77.5%) both underperform simple TF-IDF classifiers (82.3%), while Mistral 7B without taxonomy alignment achieves only 65.7%. These results confirm that taxonomy-aligned prompting rather than model scale, domain pretraining, or fine-tuning is the critical factor enabling high classification accuracy. Our dataset and code are publicly available to support reproducible supply chain security research.

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