Toward a Threat Actor Profiling Taxonomy for Pre-Release Risk Management of Open-Weight Frontier Models

Abstract: Pre-release risk management for frontier AI misuse risks routinely leaves threat actor assumptions implicit, inconsistently specified, or ungrounded. This capstone argues that explicit adversary characterization should be regarded as a prerequisite for evaluations that are interpretable, comparable, and faithful to the risks they target. We propose a six-attribute taxonomy (covering technical sophistication, prior domain knowledge, organizational capacity, operational infrastructure, financial capacity, and time horizon) with empirically grounded tiers derived from existing terrorism, biosecurity, and cybersecurity literature. The taxonomy is designed to function as research infrastructure: a common language for pre-specifying adversary assumptions before evaluations are conducted, analogous to pre-analysis plans for randomized controlled trials (RCTs) in medicine and economics. Its application is particularly urgent for open-weight model developers, for whom release decisions are irreversible and must anticipate adversarial reasoning.