Pluralistic Leaderboards

Abstract: Recent leaderboard-based evaluations of LLMs aggregate user feedback by fitting a Bradley--Terry model to pairwise comparisons, producing a single global ranking based on a latent quality score. While appealing for its simplicity, this approach is incompatible with heterogeneous preferences: when LLMs are used across diverse tasks and use cases, users who favor fundamentally different model behaviors can be systematically misrepresented when collapsed into a single quality score. To address this issue, we study \emph{pluralistic leaderboards} that aim to remain \emph{stable} with respect to heterogeneous user populations. Drawing on ideas from social choice theory, we adapt the notion of \emph{local stability}, which requires that no model outside the top-$k$ positions is collectively preferred to the top-$k$ set by more than $O(1/k)$ fraction of users. Building on techniques from the social choice literature, we design an alternative leaderboard mechanism that satisfies local stability while eliciting only $\widetilde{O}(k)$ pairwise comparisons per user, where $k$ is the size of the prefix for which stability is guaranteed. Using data from LMArena, we show that standard Bradley--Terry aggregation can violate local stability in practice, whereas our method provides substantially stronger stability guarantees.