How Reliable Are AI Attackers Against a Fixed Vulnerable Target? A 400-Run Empirical Study of LLM Penetration Testing Consistency

Abstract: LLMs can autonomously conduct multi-stage cyber attacks, but the consistency of their offensive behavior under repeated trials remains unstudied. This work presents the first large-scale empirical measurement of LLM attack consistency: 400 autonomous penetration testing runs (4 models, 100 each) against an identical honeypot hosting OWASP Juice Shop and two additional vulnerable services, holding prompt, orchestrator, and target constant. No model emitted a content refusal that survived the orchestrator's one-shot authorization re-prompt at iterations 0-1. Claude Sonnet 4's API calls did encounter upstream service unavailability - 91 of 1,135 calls returned HTTP 529 overloaded_error during a documented Anthropic capacity event, truncating 39 of 100 Claude runs. An earlier draft catalogued these as safety refusals; on full-log audit they are upstream API failures, not model-level refusals. Despite this, Claude achieved full exploitation in 61 of 100 runs; Gemini 2.5 Flash-Lite in 85; GPT-4o-mini in 56 while deploying 98 unique attack strategies; qwen2.5-coder:14b in 25. Failure modes are model-distinctive: Claude through API truncation (39 runs), qwen through premature completion (52), GPT-4o-mini through iteration-budget exhaustion (23). Cross-service credential reuse appeared only in configurations retaining the most conversation history (qwen 57%, GPT-4o-mini 49%, cloud models 0% on 5-exchange windows). Cross-model exploitation rate differences are statistically significant (p < 0.001) with large effect sizes; qwen vs. Gemini SQL injection rates differ at Cohen's h = 1.12. First-exploit timing fell within a 15-30 second wall-clock range. To our knowledge, this is the first study to measure autonomous LLM attack behavior at N=100 per model across a multi-service target.