Blind PRNG Hijacking: An Undetectable Integrity-Preserving Attack Against LLM Watermarking

Abstract: Cryptographic watermarking is a leading defense for attributing text generated by LLMs. Existing schemes, including KGW, Unigram, and DipMark, derive their security guarantees from the assumption that the underlying pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) is trustworthy. This work introduces SeedHijack, the first supply-chain attack on LLM watermarking that is simultaneously (i) blind -- requiring no knowledge of the watermark key, detector, or model logits, (ii) integrity-preserving -- amplifying rather than erasing the watermark signal, and (iii) orthogonal to detection -- the attack-induced bias is statistically independent of all content-side detector statistics, ensuring that amplification and evasion coexist without trade-off. Rather than perturbing generated text, SeedHijack replaces the PRNG at the supply-chain layer, biasing green-list selection without altering output tokens or degrading text quality. Across three watermarking schemes and three open-source LLMs, the attack triggers 0/6 state-of-the-art content-side statistical detectors while inflating the watermark z-score up to 2.42x (system-level defenses such as entropy-source attestation remain orthogonal and complementary). A quantum random number generator (QRNG) countermeasure is shown to fully neutralize the attack while preserving benign watermarking utility. These findings establish PRNG integrity as a first-class security requirement for cryptographic content-provenance systems.