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Consciousness, Quantum Mechanics, and the Limits of Scientific Objectivism

Published 14 Apr 2026 in quant-ph and physics.hist-ph | (2604.14234v1)

Abstract: Consciousness and quantum mechanics are among the most puzzling phenomena studied in the sciences. Some scholars suggest they are related, though others think this claim commits a "minimization of mystery" fallacy. The aim of this programmatic paper is to draw attention to a less widely discussed parallel between consciousness and quantum mechanics: both challenge the classical objectivist worldview of science. Under certain assumptions, they are each in tension with a package of metaphysical theses -- "non-relationalism", "non-fragmentation", and "one world" -- that jointly make up that worldview. This points to three distinct non-objectivist responses: the "relationalist", "fragmentalist", and "many-subjective-worlds" ones. We will map out their pros and cons.

Summary

  • The paper demonstrates that first-person realism in consciousness and measurement realism in quantum mechanics expose inherent contradictions in traditional scientific objectivism through a quadrilemma and heptalemma.
  • It systematically reviews historical and modern treatments to categorize non-objectivist responses into relationalism, fragmentalism, and many-subjective-worlds, outlining their technical and philosophical trade-offs.
  • The analysis implies that reconciling first-person experience with quantum predictions demands abandoning at least one core objectivist presupposition, prompting a paradigmatic shift in scientific metaphysics.

Consciousness, Quantum Mechanics, and Non-Objectivist Revisions to Metaphysics

Introduction and Context

The paper "Consciousness, Quantum Mechanics, and the Limits of Scientific Objectivism" (2604.14234) by DeBrota and List presents a rigorous, programmatic philosophical argument centered on a structural parallel between two perennial "hard problems": consciousness and the interpretation of quantum mechanics. Rather than positing a direct explanatory link between the two, the analysis highlights how both domains expose deep limitations in the set of metaphysical principles—non-relationalism, non-fragmentation, and one-world—that together form the core of scientific objectivism.

The authors review contemporary and historical treatments of consciousness and quantum theory, culminating in the formulation of two parallel "no-go" theorems that structure the possible responses to these problems: the quadrilemma for consciousness and the heptalemma for quantum mechanics. They systematically catalog three broad strategies for abandoning objectivist metaphysics in response: relationalism, fragmentalism, and many-subjective-worlds theories. The analysis is conducted with substantial technical and philosophical rigor.

The Challenge from Consciousness

The hard problem of consciousness is framed following Chalmers' analysis, focusing on the ontological gap between third-personal, objective accounts (as codified in physical science) and first-personal, subjective experience. The logical possibility of philosophical zombies and the irreducibility of phenomenal facts motivate a strong form of first-personal realism. The authors highlight that nearly all mainstream treatments, from physicalism to dualism, share the implicit objectivist assumption that reality consists of a unified, coherent world populated by absolute (rather than relational) facts.

However, the acceptance of first-personal facts for each conscious subject, together with non-solipsism and the three objectivist theses, yields contradiction—a result extending from Fine (2005) and detailed in List (2025). The systematization of the metaphysical options demonstrates that maintaining first-personal realism without solipsism necessitates abandoning at least one of the objectivist premises.

The Quantum Mechanical Parallel

Quantum mechanics is shown to challenge objectivism in a structurally similar manner. Beginning with the EPR paradox and Bell's theorem, the paper reviews canonical premises—locality, measurement independence, and realism. The heptalemma of DeBrota and List (2026), extending Bell’s theorem, decomposes realism into four sub-theses, isolating those that amount to objectivist assumptions.

Under the empirical adequacy of quantum predictions, the simultaneous maintenance of measurement realism, non-solipsism, and objectivism (understood as one world, non-fragmentation, and non-relationalism) is shown to be inconsistent. Thus, the options in interpretive response mirror those articulated for consciousness.

Non-Objectivist Routes: Taxonomy and Evaluation

The paper develops a three-fold taxonomy of non-objectivist approaches, each entailing a distinct metaphysical revision:

  • Relationalism: Facts (about consciousness or measurement) are only intelligible as relative to a perspective, observer, or system. In quantum mechanics, this is manifest in relational quantum mechanics (RQM), e.g., Rovelli (2025). While technically less radical (still offering a single, coherent world), the authors note that this approach may fail to capture the essence of first-person facts in consciousness.
  • Fragmentalism: Reality is a patchwork of locally coherent but globally incompatible fragments of facts. Quantum-logical approaches and fragmentalist QBism exemplify this stance, where the underlying logic is non-Boolean and probabilistic coherence is only a local property. This sacrifices the unity of the world for the metaphysical primacy of first-personal or measurement facts, at a technical cost of developing new formal apparatus for global incoherence.
  • Many-Subjective-Worlds: Reality is a collection (a "library") of subjectively centered worlds, each coherent from its own perspective. This is consistently defended for consciousness (List 2023) and increasingly in QBist models of quantum theory (e.g., Mermin 2019). Third-personal objectivity is reconstructed as invariance across subjective worlds.

The authors discuss the technical and philosophical implications of each approach, noting that a many-subjective-worlds ontology preserves local coherence and offers a generalization of objectivity as equivalence across subjectively-indexed worlds, aligning with Husserlian phenomenology. The metaphysical cost is a commitment to radical pluralism and the abandonment of the unity of the world at the fundamental level.

Implications and Prospects

The analysis has substantial implications for the philosophy of mind, foundations of quantum mechanics, and the general metaphysics of science. It formally demonstrates that, on pain of logical contradiction, the explanatory gaps in consciousness and quantum mechanics cannot be bridged within the traditional objectivist metaphysics. Instead, they motivate precise non-objectivist alternatives, each with distinct explanatory and technical challenges.

For quantum foundations, this analysis strengthens the case for revisiting relational, operational, and "subjective" interpretations—not as optional philosophical stances but as forced by deep no-go theorems when realist and local assumptions are retained. The same holds for the philosophy of mind: one cannot explain consciousness in fundamentally objectivist terms without loss, reducibility, or brute mystery.

While the paper does not privilege one route over others, it emphasizes the explanatory trade-offs and the necessity of philosophical clarity regarding what is sacrificed and what is preserved in each option. It suggests that future research in both analytic philosophy and quantum foundations must grapple directly with the non-objectivist turn if it is to make theoretical progress.

Conclusion

"Consciousness, Quantum Mechanics, and the Limits of Scientific Objectivism" (2604.14234) delivers a sophisticated, formally-precise argument that links two central puzzles in science and philosophy—not via reduction, but by analyzing their common metaphysical upshot. The paper forces renewed scrutiny of the metaphysical foundations of science, mapping the space of non-objectivist responses through a technical taxonomy and highlighting the substantial cost and necessity of such revisions assuming certain premises are to be retained. This programmatic vision will inform philosophical and foundational debates about the nature of reality, the structure of explanation, and the viability of objectivist science across disciplines.

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Consciousness, Quantum Mechanics, and the Limits of Scientific Objectivism — Explained Simply

1) What is this paper about? (Overview)

This paper says that two big mysteries—how conscious experience works and how quantum mechanics (the physics of tiny things) works—both push against a traditional scientific worldview that assumes there is a single, fully objective picture of reality. The authors argue that, under some reasonable assumptions, both topics clash with that “one-objective-world” picture in similar ways. They then lay out three alternative ways to rethink reality that could handle these clashes.

2) What questions are the authors asking? (Key objectives)

The authors focus on simple, big questions:

  • Can a single, fully objective description of the world include first‑person experiences like “I feel pain now”?
  • In quantum mechanics, can we keep the idea that facts are the same for everyone, everywhere, at once—no matter who observes what?
  • If not, what kinds of changes to our view of reality would make sense?

3) How do they study it? (Approach in plain language)

This is a philosophy paper, not a lab experiment. The authors:

  • Compare ideas from philosophy of mind (about consciousness) and foundations of physics (about quantum theory).
  • Use thought experiments (like “philosophical zombies”) and famous results in quantum theory (like Bell’s theorem) that show some common assumptions can’t all be true at once.
  • Set up clear assumptions and show how those assumptions can’t all fit together, which forces a choice about what to give up.
  • Map the options rather than pick a single winner, explaining the pros and cons.

Helpful analogies:

  • “View from nowhere” vs. “view from somewhere”: Science often aims for a “drone camera” view that’s the same for everyone. Conscious experience is like being in the scene with your own eyes—personal and from a specific place and time.
  • Puzzle pieces: The traditional view assumes all true facts fit together into one coherent puzzle. The authors ask whether some puzzle pieces might be perspective‑dependent, belong to different “frames,” or even belong to different “puzzles.”

4) What are the main ideas and findings? (Core arguments and why they matter)

The traditional “objectivist” package

The authors say mainstream science tacitly assumes three things:

  • One world: There is a single, shared world that exhausts reality.
  • Non‑fragmentation: All the true facts about that world fit together into one coherent picture.
  • Non‑relationalism: Facts are absolute (“such‑and‑such is the case”), not relative to a person or perspective.

They call the combination “objectivism.”

Consciousness challenges objectivism

  • First‑person facts: Some facts seem essentially personal, like “I am in pain now” or “I am seeing beige right now.” These aren’t the same as the third‑person report “Christian is in pain at 3 pm.” The first statement centers on the experiencer’s point of view.
  • The authors argue that if you accept:
    • First‑person facts are real (there really is something it’s like for someone),
    • There’s more than one conscious subject (not just me),
    • And the objectivist package above,

then you run into a contradiction. In short: if first‑person facts are real for each subject and are supposed to be absolute, it’s hard to merge all those centered facts into one single, coherent, perspective‑free world.

Why this matters: It suggests that trying to treat experience as just another “objective” fact may miss what makes experience special: it is always from someone’s point of view.

Quantum mechanics challenges objectivism in a similar way

  • In quantum mechanics, measurements and observers seem to matter in ways that don’t fit neatly with “the same facts for everyone, all at once.” Famous paradoxes (like Schrödinger’s cat) and theorems (like Bell’s) show you can’t keep all the classical assumptions about a single, observer‑independent reality and still match the experiments.
  • The authors say the pressure in quantum theory mirrors the pressure from consciousness: both push against the idea that all facts are absolute and neatly combine into one global picture that looks the same from any viewpoint.

Three families of responses (ways forward)

To ease the clash, the authors map three non‑objectivist options. Think of these as three different choices about which part of objectivism to relax:

  • Relationalism: Some facts are relative to observers or perspectives.
    • Everyday analogy: “The cup is to the left” depends on where you stand.
    • Consciousness angle: First‑person facts are genuinely about a subject’s standpoint.
    • Quantum angle: “Relational” interpretations say measurement outcomes can be relative to observers or systems.
  • Fragmentalism: Not all true claims can be combined into one coherent, all‑at‑once snapshot.
    • Everyday analogy: Different frames of a movie can’t all be “the present” at once.
    • Quantum angle: Some sets of measurement results can’t be joined into a single, consistent story without contradiction.
    • Big idea: Reality might be “in pieces” depending on contexts like time or measurement setup.
  • Many‑subjective‑worlds: There isn’t just one world; there are multiple, especially from the perspective of subjects.
    • Everyday analogy: Instead of one shared Google Doc, there are multiple linked docs, one per subject’s perspective.
    • Quantum angle: This echoes “many‑worlds”-style ideas (though the authors emphasize “many subjective worlds”), where different outcomes or perspectives correspond to different branches or worlds.

The paper doesn’t claim one is definitely right; it sets out the landscape so readers can see the trade‑offs.

5) Why does this matter? (Implications and impact)

  • For science: It suggests there may be limits to the fully objective “view from nowhere.” To make sense of both experience and quantum phenomena, we might need to allow facts that are relative to standpoints, accept that not all facts fit into a single global snapshot, or even consider multiple worlds.
  • For philosophy of mind: It strengthens the case that conscious experience isn’t just another “objective” property. First‑person facts may be part of reality in their own right.
  • For foundations of physics: It supports interpretations of quantum mechanics that make room for observers, contexts, or branching worlds, instead of insisting on a single, observer‑independent catalog of facts.
  • For big‑picture thinking: The same kind of pressure shows up in both areas. That parallel hints we may need a gentler, more flexible picture of reality—one that respects perspectives and contexts—if we want a unified understanding of mind and nature.

In short: The authors argue that both consciousness and quantum mechanics put similar pressure on the idea of one, fully objective world. They chart three clear paths for rethinking that idea and invite us to weigh which path makes the most sense.

View Paper Prompt  View All Prompts 

Knowledge Gaps

Below is a single, consolidated list of concrete knowledge gaps, limitations, and open questions the paper leaves unresolved. Each item is phrased to be actionable for future research.

  • Formalize the claimed inconsistency: Provide a rigorous derivation (e.g., in a precise logic or model-theoretic framework) that first-personal realism + non-solipsism + objectivism (one world + non-fragmentation + non-relationalism) are jointly inconsistent, specifying exactly which inferential steps require which metaphysical assumptions.
  • Semantic framework for first-personal facts: Develop a formal semantics (e.g., using centered worlds, subject-indexed truthmakers, or fine-grained fact individuation) that captures “I-facts” as facts (not merely de se representations), and show how these semantics interact with non-relationalism and coherence constraints.
  • Clarify “non-relationalism” versus “first-personal realism”: Precisely define when a first-personal fact counts as “relative” versus “absolute,” and test whether weakening non-relationalism (or reconceiving absolutism) can accommodate first-personal facts without collapsing into trivial relativism.
  • Coherence notion in “non-fragmentation”: Make explicit what “coherently coinstantiated” means (logical consistency, hyperintensional coherence, or metaphysical compossibility), and demonstrate how first-personal facts violate it (if they do) under the stated assumptions.
  • Disambiguate “one world”: Provide a model of “world” that can be evaluated against alternatives (fragmentalism, many-subjective-worlds, relationalism) and show how each modifies or preserves the Kantian/Wittgensteinian notions of a totality of facts.
  • Map non-objectivist options to formal frameworks: For each of the three proposed responses (relationalist, fragmentalist, many-subjective-worlds), specify a formal ontology and logic (e.g., multi-centered truth conditions, fragmental truth-operators, subject-indexed world decomposition), including preservation or revision of classical logic.
  • Decision criteria among non-objectivist options: Articulate clear theoretical virtues (explanatory power, parsimony, compatibility with existing science, predictive/operational import) and identify discriminating tests that could favor one non-objectivist framework over others.
  • Bridge principles from first-personal to third-personal data: Specify methodological rules for moving from subject-centered facts to publicly shareable, intersubjective evidence in science, and analyze limits on such “de-perspectivization.”
  • Empirical operationalization in consciousness science: Propose protocols linking first-person reports to neural measures that respect the metaphysics of first-person facts (e.g., subject-indexed data models), and identify testable consequences that differ from standard physicalist frameworks.
  • Causal status of first-person facts: Determine whether first-personal facts are causally efficacious, epiphenomenal, or realized via underlying structures, and assess risks of causal overdetermination or violations of physical causal closure.
  • Scope and individuation of subjects: Provide criteria for counting and individuating “conscious subjects” (e.g., split-brain cases, AI systems, dissociative states) in a first-personal realist ontology, and analyze how subject identity over time interacts with the metaphysical framework.
  • Reliability and error of first-person facts: Clarify whether first-person facts are infallible, corrigible, or gradable, and model misreport, illusion, and introspective error without undermining their fact-status.
  • Taxonomy vis-à-vis extant consciousness theories: Precisely locate panpsychism, neutral monism, IIT, GWT, and higher-order theories within or against the three non-objectivist options, noting what each must change to be compatible with first-personal realism.
  • Structure of the “quadrilemma for consciousness”: Present the quadrilemma formally (premise set, conclusion space), show its independence from contentious assumptions (e.g., zombie conceivability), and map solution spaces to the three non-objectivist responses.
  • Structural isomorphism claim across domains: Make explicit the mapping between the consciousness quadrilemma and the quantum “heptalemma”: identify the premise-to-premise correspondences and the exact sense in which the challenges to objectivism are structurally parallel rather than merely analogous.
  • Specify the “heptalemma for quantum mechanics”: State the seven assumptions transparently (e.g., locality/no-signalling, outcome definiteness, single outcome, unitary dynamics, etc.), their formal content, and the exact minimal inconsistent subset(s).
  • Map quantum interpretations to the three responses: Provide a careful alignment (and disalignment) of Relational QM, QBism, Everettian approaches, collapse models, and ψ-epistemic/ψ-ontic views with the relationalist, fragmentalist, and many-subjective-worlds categories, noting nontrivial mismatches.
  • Operational/empirical signatures in quantum experiments: Identify experiment classes (e.g., Wigner’s friend extensions, delayed-choice, entanglement swapping with nested observers) whose outcomes or analysis would differentially support relationalist, fragmentalist, or many-subjective-worlds treatments.
  • Compatibility with relativity and no-signalling: Demonstrate how each non-objectivist response preserves relativistic causal structure and no-signalling, particularly under multi-observer scenarios (e.g., friend-of-a-friend setups).
  • Decoherence and macro-definiteness: Show how each approach accounts for classicality emergence and definite macroscopic records, detailing whether decoherence is sufficient or requires metaphysical supplementation (and what kind).
  • Probability and decision theory: Provide subject-centered probability and updating rules compatible with first-person facts (and with quantum probabilities), and analyze whether Dutch-book or representation theorems hold under the non-objectivist frameworks (e.g., QBist-style Bayesianism).
  • Shared scientific practice under non-objectivism: Explain how cross-subject consensus, replication, and theory confirmation are secured if facts are subject-indexed or fragmented; propose new norms for evidence aggregation and model comparison.
  • Many-subjective-worlds metaphysics: Specify the count, structure, and cross-subject relations of “subjective worlds,” including conditions for intersubjective overlap, communication, and referential success across subjects.
  • Fragmentalism safeguards: Clarify how fragmentation avoids trivial inconsistency or explosion, what logic it uses (paraconsistent, hyperintensional), and how fragments recombine to support systematic inquiry.
  • Relationalism without regress: Define the relata (subjects, measurement contexts, environmental frames), prevent infinite regress of relativization, and identify invariant structures that can ground stable scientific claims.
  • Interaction with mathematics and physical formalism: Determine whether the Hilbert-space framework and standard mathematical tools need modification under the proposed metaphysics, and spell out any replacement structures if needed.
  • Test sensitivity to key assumptions: Assess how the core argument changes if one rejects zombie conceivability, weakens non-relationalism, denies non-solipsism, or reinterprets “facts” as linguistic/conceptual rather than ontic items.
  • Communication of indexicals in science: Develop a theory of public representation for indexical/first-person content that enables precise scientific reporting without erasing the metaphysical distinctiveness of first-person facts.
  • Limits of the “minimization of mystery” caution: Provide criteria for when cross-domain structural parallels warrant transfer of conceptual tools, avoiding superficial analogies while exploiting genuine isomorphisms.
  • Roadmap to measurable progress: Set out a research program with milestones (formal semantics; logic of fragments; experimental paradigms in neuroscience and quantum foundations; decision-theoretic results; intersubjective aggregation protocols) that can incrementally adjudicate among the proposed responses.
View Paper Prompt  View All Prompts 

Practical Applications

Immediate Applications

The paper’s core insight—that both consciousness research and quantum mechanics pressure the classical objectivist package (one world, non-fragmentation, non-relationalism)—yields actionable steps that treat perspective-relative (first-person) facts as legitimate inputs and that make observer/context explicit in models and workflows.

  • Perspective-aware research protocols in neuroscience and psychology (academia, healthcare)
    • Integrate first-person data as first-class evidence alongside neural/behavioral measures (e.g., structured experience sampling combined with EEG/fMRI; neurophenomenology-informed protocols).
    • Tools/workflows: mobile ESM apps synced with lab sensors; preregistration templates requiring explicit observer/subject context fields; analysis pipelines that co-index signals with subject-level experiential annotations.
    • Assumptions/dependencies: acceptance that first-person reports contribute evidential weight; updated IRB templates; modest software integration.
  • Context- and subject-indexed knowledge representation (software, data engineering)
    • Represent facts as relative-to-agent/time/context where appropriate (e.g., RDF named graphs, provenance-aware ontologies, context logic); avoid collapsing all data into a single, “view-from-nowhere” layer.
    • Tools/products: “perspectival” knowledge graphs; belief stores with contexts; inconsistency-tolerant reasoners (paraconsistent logics); truth-maintenance systems that track perspective.
    • Assumptions/dependencies: governance for context schemas; performance trade-offs; interoperability standards.
  • Perspective-sensitive AI development and evaluation (software, AI)
    • Train and evaluate models with multi-perspective metrics (e.g., diverse rater pools, multi-calibration across user groups); build per-user preference/reward models rather than universalized ones.
    • Tools/products: RLHF pipelines stratified by perspective; “lens-conditioned” inference APIs; dashboards that report performance by perspective segments.
    • Assumptions/dependencies: privacy protections for user-level models; fairness oversight; data diversity.
  • Human–computer interaction that respects subjective states (consumer software, education, media)
    • Interfaces that adapt to user’s reported/estimated experiential state (e.g., cognitive load, affect) and offer “perspective lenses” (alternative contextualizations of content).
    • Tools/products: consented affect-sensing UIs; adjustable news/research visualizations showing multiple observer-relative frames; accessibility modes tuned to subjective feedback.
    • Assumptions/dependencies: robust consent; safe state inference; UX research.
  • Clinical and regulatory reporting that includes first-person outcomes (healthcare, policy)
    • Require patient-reported outcomes (PROs) and phenomenological descriptors as primary endpoints where relevant; declare observer/assessor context in methods.
    • Workflows/products: trial templates with PRO primacy; registries tagging assessments with assessor identity and perspective.
    • Assumptions/dependencies: regulator buy-in; clinician training; harmonized PRO instruments.
  • Interpretationally neutral, observer-context-rich practices in quantum experiments (quantum tech, academia)
    • Record observer-lab context and measurement narratives (e.g., in Wigner’s-friend-style setups) as metadata; design protocols compatible with relational/fragmentalist readings without changing hardware.
    • Tools/products: lab notebooks and data schemas capturing observer roles and context; analysis scripts that keep context tags through data reduction.
    • Assumptions/dependencies: community norms; minimal overhead to existing pipelines.
  • Multi-perspective analytics for organizations (finance, operations, public policy)
    • Dashboards that maintain parallel, stakeholder-specific views rather than forcing early aggregation; adopt inconsistency-tolerant analytics when data conflict across perspectives.
    • Tools/products: multi-view BI; CRDT-backed event logs preserving divergent narratives; scenario-planning tools that encode perspective-relative assumptions.
    • Assumptions/dependencies: culture change; governance for which divergences are retained vs. reconciled.
  • Cross-disciplinary education on objectivity and perspective (education)
    • Modules that integrate philosophy of mind, phenomenology, and quantum foundations into STEM curricula; training on perspective-aware methodology.
    • Products: short courses; case-based teaching materials; lab guidelines.
    • Assumptions/dependencies: curricular approval; instructor capacity.
  • Ethical review that counts subjective harms/benefits (policy, research governance)
    • IRBs/ethics boards explicitly assess experiential impacts (e.g., stress, dignity) as primary considerations; mandate reporting of subjective risk.
    • Assumptions/dependencies: updated review criteria; reviewer training.

Long-Term Applications

If non-objectivist responses (relationalism, fragmentalism, many-subjective-worlds) gain traction, deeper shifts in scientific method, engineering, and governance are likely.

  • A dual-track scientific method that treats first-person facts as fundamental data (academia, healthcare)
    • Mature standards for collecting, validating, and integrating subjective data with third-person measures; reproducibility frameworks that factor in observer/subject perspective.
    • Tools/products: “first-person data” repositories; standardized phenomenological taxonomies; statistical methods for cross-perspective synthesis.
    • Assumptions/dependencies: consensus on first-person data standards; methodological advances; long-horizon funding.
  • “Many-subjective-worlds” architectures in AI and platforms (software, social media)
    • Systems built around per-user world models with explicit mediation layers to negotiate between models; conflict-aware recommendation and moderation.
    • Tools/products: personal AI with sealed, user-specific ontologies; federation/mediation engines; provenance-preserving content pipes.
    • Assumptions/dependencies: compute/storage for per-user models; privacy-by-design; alignment and safety research.
  • Fragmentalist knowledge infrastructures (software, web standards)
    • Web and enterprise knowledge bases that allow stable coexistence of mutually incompatible, context-bounded fact sets, with principled cross-context translation.
    • Tools/products: industry-grade paraconsistent/bridging reasoners; W3C-style “Context RDF” or successor standards; developer tooling for context-first schemas.
    • Assumptions/dependencies: standards adoption; performance tuning; developer education.
  • Neurophenomenology-informed clinical care and BCIs (healthcare, medical devices)
    • Diagnostic and therapeutic pipelines that jointly optimize objective biomarkers and subjective experience; BCIs calibrated on first-person reports.
    • Tools/products: clinician decision support combining PROs and biomarkers; closed-loop neurostimulation tuned to experiential feedback.
    • Assumptions/dependencies: clinical validation; safety/efficacy trials; reimbursement models.
  • Robotics with explicit human perspective models (robotics, HRI)
    • Robots maintain relational fact bases per human partner, reasoning over perspective-relative states (beliefs, affordances, preferences) rather than a monolithic scene truth.
    • Tools/products: perspective-indexed world models; conflict-resolution policies when views diverge; training datasets labeled by perspective.
    • Assumptions/dependencies: robust perception of human states; scalable memory; safety guarantees.
  • Legal and policy frameworks for perspectival evidence (law, governance)
    • Rules of evidence and administrative processes that formally recognize first-person facts and manage cross-perspective contradictions without defaulting to a single “objective” narrative.
    • Tools/products: evidentiary schemas with perspective provenance; deliberation platforms supporting multi-view consensus.
    • Assumptions/dependencies: jurisprudential reform; stakeholder trust; safeguards against manipulation.
  • Quantum-foundational experiments targeting observer-dependence (quantum foundations, security)
    • Device designs and protocols to distinguish relational/fragmentalist/many-worlds predictions (e.g., advanced Wigner’s friend and networked observer tests); potential implications for quantum network security models that condition on observer roles.
    • Tools/products: bespoke entangled-lab architectures; observer-aware security proofs.
    • Assumptions/dependencies: theoretical discriminators; experimental feasibility; funding for high-precision tests.
  • Governance and policymaking with built-in multi-perspective synthesis (public policy)
    • Decision systems that keep multiple stakeholder “worlds” live through the policy cycle, using agreement technologies to identify robust invariants and acceptable divergences.
    • Tools/products: policy twin platforms; social choice mechanisms adapted to perspective-tagged inputs.
    • Assumptions/dependencies: political will; transparency norms; civic education.

Notes on Dependencies and Feasibility

  • Many immediate applications do not require endorsing any specific interpretation of quantum mechanics or a full commitment to first-personal realism; they only require operationalizing observer/subject context and treating subjective reports as structured data.
  • Long-term applications hinge on broader theoretical and cultural shifts: acceptance of non-objectivist theses in target communities, maturation of standards and methods for subjective data, and safeguards for privacy, fairness, and robustness.
  • For quantum-related applications, interpretational neutrality is prudent in engineering until experiments decisively discriminate views; in the meantime, capturing observer context is low-risk and future-proof.
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Glossary

  • absolutism: Fine’s label for the view that facts obtain simpliciter (absolutely) rather than only relative to something else. "Fine (2005) call this thesis ``absolutism''."
  • algorithmic processes: Step-by-step computational procedures; invoked to argue that consciousness may not arise from ordinary computation alone. "consciousness cannot result from ordinary algorithmic processes but may depend on non-computable processes"
  • Bell's theorem: A result showing that no local hidden-variable theory can reproduce all quantum mechanical predictions. "Bell's theorem in quantum mechanics (Bell 1964)"
  • collapse of the wave function: The transition of a quantum system from a superposition to a definite outcome, sometimes posited to be linked to consciousness. "the collapse of the wave function is triggered by consciousness"
  • dualism: The view that mind and body (or mental and physical properties) are fundamentally distinct. "In effect, Chalmers proposes a modern, scientific version of dualism"
  • Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox: A thought experiment highlighting quantum nonlocal correlations and questions about completeness of quantum mechanics. "the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox"
  • epistemological thesis: A claim about knowledge or how we know, contrasted here with claims about what exists (ontology). "Objectivism thus defined is an ontological rather than epistemological thesis."
  • first-personal facts: Facts that are essentially indexed to, or centered on, a subject’s perspective. "Postulating first-personal facts is still very heterodox in both science and analytic philosophy."
  • first-personal realism: The thesis that reality includes first-personal facts for each conscious subject. "First-personal realism: Reality includes, for each conscious subject, some first-personal facts."
  • fragmentalist: An approach that allows reality to be composed of fragments that may not form a single coherent, unified whole. "the 'relationalist', 'fragmentalist', and 'many-subjective-worlds' ones."
  • hard problem of consciousness: The challenge of explaining why and how physical processes give rise to subjective experience. "the 'hard problem of consciousness' and the mind-body problem more broadly"
  • heptalemma: A seven-pronged incompatibility or challenge framework used here for quantum mechanics. "a 'heptalemma for quantum mechanics' (DeBrota and List 2026)."
  • intersubjective agreement: Convergence across different subjects’ perspectives, used to characterize what counts as objective. "intersubjective agreement."
  • many-subjective-worlds: An approach positing multiple subjective worlds rather than a single objective one. "the 'relationalist', 'fragmentalist', and 'many-subjective-worlds' ones."
  • microtubules: Cytoskeletal structures in neurons proposed to host quantum effects relevant to consciousness. "quantum effects in tiny microtubules in the brain"
  • monist theories: Views positing one kind of fundamental property that has both physical (extrinsic/functional) and phenomenal (intrinsic) aspects. "For an overview of such 'monist' theories, see Mørch (2024)."
  • non-computable processes: Processes not capturable by any algorithm; proposed by some as necessary for consciousness. "consciousness cannot result from ordinary algorithmic processes but may depend on non-computable processes"
  • non-fragmentation: The thesis that any world is a coherent totality of facts that can be jointly instantiated. "Non-fragmentation: Any world (actual or possible) is a coherent collection of facts."
  • non-physicalists: Those who deny that physical facts alone suffice to explain consciousness and posit additional (e.g., phenomenal) properties. "Non-physicalists, like Chalmers, object that this worldview fails to do justice..."
  • non-relationalism: The thesis that facts are absolute (not relative to perspectives or parameters). "Non-relationalism: Any fact within the collection of facts that constitute reality is of the absolute form 'such and such is the case', not of the relative form 'such and such is the case, relative to such and such'."
  • non-solipsism: The assumption that more than one conscious subject exists. "Non-solipsism: More than one conscious subject is real; in particular, I am not the only conscious subject."
  • no-go results: Theorems demonstrating that certain combinations of assumptions are impossible. "various 'no-go' results"
  • objectivism: The conjunction of the “one world,” “non-fragmentation,” and “non-relationalism” theses about reality. "Let us use the label 'objectivism' for the conjunction of the three theses just stated: one world, non-fragmentation, and non-relationalism."
  • observership: The status or role of being an observer; here, the idea that quantum problems are tied to the observer’s relation to the world. "the notion of observership, crucially involving the relation between a subject's experience and the rest of the world"
  • ontological thesis: A claim about what exists or the nature of reality (as opposed to how we know it). "Objectivism thus defined is an ontological rather than epistemological thesis."
  • one world: The thesis that reality is exhausted by a single objective world rather than multiple subjective worlds. "One world: Reality is exhausted by one world (which we may think of as an objective world), not multiple worlds (which we may think of as subjective ones)."
  • phenomenological tradition: A philosophical movement emphasizing first-person experience and subjectivity (e.g., Husserl). "Scholars in the phenomenological tradition have also emphasized the limitations of the objectivist worldview"
  • phenomenal properties: Properties responsible for the qualitative aspects of experience (what it feels like). "but also distinct 'phenomenal' properties, which are responsible for conscious experiences."
  • philosophical zombie: A hypothetical being physically identical to a human but lacking conscious experience. "A philosophical 'zombie' is a hypothetical creature that is objectively indistinguishable from each of us but that subjectively experiences nothing."
  • physicalism: The view that all facts, including those about consciousness, are grounded in the physical and require no non-physical properties. "Physicalists think that it is unnecessary to postulate any non-physical properties over and above the ordinary physical ones"
  • possible world: A coherent, complete way reality might be, used in modal and metaphysical analyses. "would not be a possible world as conventionally understood"
  • quadrilemma: A four-pronged incompatibility or challenge framework, here for theories of consciousness. "a 'quadrilemma for theories of consciousness' (List 2025)"
  • relationalist: An approach making facts relative to perspectives or relations rather than absolute. "the 'relationalist', 'fragmentalist', and 'many-subjective-worlds' ones."
  • Schrödinger's cat: A thought experiment illustrating quantum superposition and measurement paradoxes. "the puzzle of Schrödinger's cat"
  • view from nowhere: A fully impersonal, non-perspectival standpoint often associated with scientific objectivity. "what Nagel (1986) has called 'the view from nowhere'."
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