The Reasoning Error About Reasoning: Why Different Types of Reasoning Require Different Representational Structures

Abstract: Different types of reasoning impose different structural demands on representational systems, yet no systematic account of these demands exists across psychology, AI, and philosophy of mind. I propose a framework identifying four structural properties of representational systems: operability, consistency, structural preservation, and compositionality. These properties are demanded to different degrees by different forms of reasoning, from induction through analogy and causal inference to deduction and formal logic. Each property excludes a distinct class of reasoning failure. The analysis reveals a principal structural boundary: reasoning types below it can operate on associative, probabilistic representations, while those above it require all four properties to be fully satisfied. Scaling statistical learning without structural reorganization is insufficient to cross this boundary, because the structural guarantees required by deductive reasoning cannot be approximated through probabilistic means. Converging evidence from AI evaluation, developmental psychology, and cognitive neuroscience supports the framework at different levels of directness. Three testable predictions are derived, including compounding degradation, selective vulnerability to targeted structural disruption, and irreducibility under scaling. The framework is a necessary-condition account, agnostic about representational format, that aims to reorganize existing debates rather than close them.