Papers
Topics
Authors
Recent
Search
2000 character limit reached

Noncooperative Virtual Queue Coordination via Uncertainty-Aware Correlated Equilibria

Published 16 Feb 2026 in eess.SY and cs.MA | (2602.14436v1)

Abstract: Collaborative virtual queueing has been proposed as a mechanism to mitigate airport surface congestion while preserving airline autonomy over aircraft-level pushback decisions. A central coordinator can regulate aggregate pushback capacity but cannot directly control which specific aircraft are released, limiting its ability to steer system-level performance. We propose a noncooperative coordination mechanism for collaborative virtual queueing based on the correlated equilibrium concept, which enables the coordinator to provide incentive-compatible recommendations on aircraft-level pushback decisions without overriding airline autonomy. To account for uncertainty in airlines' internal cost assessments, we introduce chance constraints into the correlated equilibrium formulation. This formulation provides explicit probabilistic guarantees on incentive compatibility, allowing the coordinator to adjust the confidence level with which airlines are expected to follow the recommended actions. We further propose a scalable algorithm for computing chance-constrained correlated equilibria by exploiting a reduced-rank structure. Numerical experiments demonstrate that the proposed method scales to realistic traffic levels up to 210 eligible pushbacks per hour, reduces accumulated delay by up to approximately 8.9% compared to current first-come-first-served schemes, and reveals a trade-off between confidence level, deviation robustness, and achievable cost efficiency.

Summary

No one has generated a summary of this paper yet.

Paper to Video (Beta)

No one has generated a video about this paper yet.

Whiteboard

No one has generated a whiteboard explanation for this paper yet.

Open Problems

We haven't generated a list of open problems mentioned in this paper yet.

Continue Learning

We haven't generated follow-up questions for this paper yet.

Collections

Sign up for free to add this paper to one or more collections.