Ghosting Your LLM: Without The Knowledge of Your Gradient and Data (2511.22700v1)

Abstract: In recent years, LLMs have achieved substantial advancements and are increasingly integrated into critical applications across various domains. This growing adoption underscores the need to ensure their security and robustness. In this work, we focus on the impact of Bit Flip Attacks (BFAs) on LLMs, which exploits hardware faults to corrupt model parameters, posing a significant threat to model integrity and performance. Existing studies on BFA against LLMs adopt a progressive bit-search strategy that predominantly relies on gradient-based techniques to identify sensitive layers or weights. However, computing gradients comes with two specific challenges: First, in the context of LLMs, it increases computational and memory costs exponentially, and Second, it requires access to a sample victim dataset or knowledge of the victim domain to compute the gradient. In this work, we investigate beyond the scope of attack efficacy and aim to develop an efficient, practical Gradient-Data-free Bit-Flip Attack. The challenge lies in the core principle of adversarial attacks, which relies heavily on computing gradients from sample test/train data and manipulating model weights based on gradient information. To overcome this, we propose novel vulnerability index metrics that can identify vulnerable weight bits in LLMs independent of any gradient or data knowledge. By removing the dependency on gradient computation, our approach drastically reduces memory requirements and scales efficiently across multiple tasks with constant complexity. Experimental results demonstrate the efficiency of our method, requiring as few as a single bit flip to achieve adversarial objectives for five open-source LLMs.