Deliberation via Matching

Abstract: We study deliberative social choice, where voters refine their preferences through small-group discussions before collective aggregation. We introduce a simple and easily implementable deliberation-via-matching protocol: for each pair of candidates, we form an arbitrary maximum matching among voters who disagree on that pair, and each matched pair deliberates. The resulting preferences (individual and deliberative) are then appropriately weighted and aggregated using the weighted uncovered set tournament rule. We show that our protocol has a tight distortion bound of $3$ within the metric distortion framework. This breaks the previous lower bound of $3.11$ for tournament rules without deliberation and matches the lower bound for deterministic social choice rules without deliberation. Our result conceptually shows that tournament rules are just as powerful as general social choice rules, when the former are given the minimal added power of pairwise deliberations. We prove our bounds via a novel bilinear relaxation of the non-linear program capturing optimal distortion, whose vertices we can explicitly enumerate, leading to an analytic proof. Loosely speaking, our key technical insight is that the distortion objective, as a function of metric distances to any three alternatives, is both supermodular and convex. We believe this characterization provides a general analytical framework for studying the distortion of other deliberative protocols, and may be of independent interest.