Evolutionary hypergame dynamics: Introspection reasoning and social learning (2509.24398v1)

Abstract: In the realm of evolutionary game theory, standard frameworks typically presuppose that every player possesses comprehensive knowledge and unrestricted access to the entire strategy space. However, real-world human society inherently harbors diverse levels of knowledge, experience, and background among individuals. Hypergames incorporate this heterogeneity by permitting individuals to differ in their access to the full strategy set, reflecting cognitive or informational constraints and giving rise to asymmetric strategic interactions. Yet, their evolutionary consequences remain underexplored. Our inquiry employs prototype models featuring three available strategies, focusing on social dilemmas involving cooperation, defection, and loner. These strategies manifest cyclic dominance, akin to the well-studied rock-paper-scissors dynamics, a foundational model in game theory. Our study spans both well-mixed and spatial lattice populations, delving into the intricacies of learning and evolution of the strategy set within the evolutionary hypergame dynamics. In stark contrast to traditional evolutionary game dynamics, our findings unveil nuanced and intricate phases, encompassing scenarios of loner dominance, coexistence of multiple strategy sets, combinations of cooperation and loner dominance, and more. Remarkably, we discern that heightened rationality significantly promotes cooperative behaviors.